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Climate Change, Dead Zones,
and Massive Problems in the
Administrative State:
A Guide for Whittling Away
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INTRODUCTION
The modern administrative state does not have the luxury of many “easy
cases.” Consider a few well-known agency headaches:
• The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which administers one of the
most potent environmental laws, the Endangered Species Act
(ESA), recently extended the law’s protections to the polar bear,1
Copyright © 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
†† Matthews & Hawkins Professor of Property, Florida State University College of Law.
†† Samuel F. Mordecai Professor of Law, Nicholas Institute Professor of Environmental
Policy, Duke University. We are thankful to Erwin Chemerinsky, Jamison Colburn, Robin Kundis
Craig, Joe DiMento, Rob Fischman, Catherine Fisk, Jody Freeman, Brian Galle, Paul Haagan,
Sam Jordan, Alex Klass, Wayne Logan, David Markell, Hari Osofsky, Michael Tigar, Manuel
Utset, Leslie Wexler, and Jonathan Wiener for input on earlier versions of this work; to
participants in law faculty workshops at Connecticut, UC Irvine, Indiana-Bloomington, Wake
Forest, Duke, and Florida State University for their helpful comments; to our research assistants
Nino Chiarello, Jake Cremer, and Vicki Shiah; and to the Duke, Florida State University, and
Harvard law schools for research and other support during the preparation of this Article. All
positions taken and mistakes made in this Article are, of course, our own. Please direct any
questions or comments to jruhl@law.fsu.edu or salzman@law.duke.edu.
1. See Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212 (May
15, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The agency’s decision to list the polar bear was, to
say the least, controversial. It followed contentious litigation designed to force the agency to reach
a decision, and while the agency did list the species as threatened, it promulgated a special rule, as
authorized under section 4(d) of the ESA, that had the effect of limiting the full extent of
regulatory protections available under the statute. See Special Rule for the Polar Bear (interim
rule), 73 Fed. Reg. 28,306 (May 15, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Special Rule for
the Polar Bear (final rule), 73 Fed. Reg. 76,249 (Dec. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
17). Both the listing decision and the special rule have been challenged in litigation that remains
pending at the time of this writing. For background on these and related events, see J.B. Ruhl,
Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to a No-Analog Future, 39
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yet the agency is powerless to stop the leading cause of the bear’s
imperilment—climate change.2
• Every morning in cities across the nation, grumbling commuters
inch along, locked in traffic gridlock, yet no local or regional
planning agency can solve its cause—suburban sprawl.3
• Each spring, a massive slug of nutrients flows down the Mississippi
River and empties into the Gulf of Mexico where it creates an
enormous hypoxic “dead zone,” an area so low in oxygen that
aquatic life must either flee or suffocate. Yet federal agencies from
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the Department of
Agriculture cannot meaningfully address its primary cause—runoff
of fertilizers and manure from Midwestern farms.4

Envtl. L. Rep. 10,735, 10,744–45 (2009).
2. At a press conference announcing the polar bear listing, Secretary of the Interior Dirk
Kempthorne warned that “[w]hile the legal standards under the ESA compel me to list the polar
bear as threatened, I want to make clear that this listing will not stop global climate change or
prevent any sea ice from melting.” News Release, U.S. Department of the Interior, Secretary
Kempthorne Announces Decision to Protect Polar Bears under Endangered Species Act (May 14,
2008), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/08_News_Releases/080514a.html. Subsequently, in
announcing his decision not to alter the previous administration’s decision regarding the status of
the polar bear and level of protection it will receive under the ESA, Interior Secretary Salazar
proclaimed that “the Endangered Species Act is not the proper mechanism for controlling our
nation’s carbon emissions.” News Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Salazar Retains
Conservation Rule for Polar Bears, Underlines Need for Comprehensive Energy and Climate
Legislation (May 8, 2009), available at http://www.fws.gov/news/NewsReleases/showNews.cfm?
newsId=20FB90B6-A188-DB01-04788E0892D91701. Climate change has been described as “a
major threat to the survival of species and integrity of ecosystems world-wide.” Philip E. Hulme,
Adapting to climate change: is there scope for ecological management in the face of a global
threat?, 42 J. Applied Ecology 784, 784 (2005). In its 2007 Synthesis Report, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicted that “[t]here is medium confidence that
approximately 20 to 30% of species assessed so far are likely to be at increased risk of extinction
if increases in global average warming exceed 1.5 to 2.5°C,” and that if warming “exceeds about
3.5°C, model projections suggest significant extinctions (40 to 70% species assessed) around the
globe.” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Summary
for Policymakers 13–14 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/
ar4_syr_spm.pdf. For additional discussion of the climate change problem, see infra Parts II–III.
3. Florida, no stranger to sprawl, defines “urban sprawl” by regulation as
urban development or uses which are located in predominantly rural areas, or rural
areas interspersed with generally low-intensity or low-density urban uses. . . . Urban
sprawl is typically manifested in one or more of the following land use or development
patterns: Leapfrog or scattered development; ribbon or strip commercial or other
development; or large expanses of predominantly low-intensity, low-density, or singleuse development.
Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 9J-5.003(134). There is ongoing debate about the pros and cons of this
particular form of suburban development and its antidote, “smart growth.” See Robert
Bruegmann, Sprawl: A Compact History (Univ. Chi. Press 2005); Julian Conrad
Juergensmeyer & Thomas E. Roberts, Land Use Planning and Development Regulation
Law § 9.1B at 475–79 (Thomson-West Practitioner Treatise Series 2d ed. 2007); Nicole Stelle
Garnett, Save the Cities, Stop the Suburbs?, 116 Yale L.J. 598 (2007). For additional discussion
of sprawl, see infra Parts II–III.
4. According to the U.S. Geological Survey,
[e]xcessive nutrients, in particular nitrogen and phosphorus, have resulted in the growth
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If you were the administrator of the Fish and Wildlife Service, or the head
of a city’s planning agency, or the Secretary of Agriculture, what would you do
to fulfill your agency’s mandate to solve these problems, knowing that your
regulatory toolkit is woefully inadequate and that any action your agency takes
will likely have little effect? That question vexes agencies dealing not only with
environmental and land use issues but also with concerns about widening
income gaps, provision of social services, rising health care costs, rising
unemployment, and a litany of other social and economic woes. Mandates that
agencies solve problems like these roll easily out of the halls of legislatures but,
as a practical matter, what should an agency do when legislatures and courts
give only sparse guidance on how to implement the delegated authority, when
the agency’s solitary actions will most assuredly not solve the problem, and
when any policy measure the agency might advance has the potential to
engender new concerns?
The dilemma agencies face in these settings is most acute in the area of
climate change. In Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,5 the
Court found that the EPA had erred in denying the state’s rulemaking petition
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles6 as an air pollutant

of large amounts of algae that decay and consume oxygen, thereby causing a zone of
low dissolved oxygen or ‘hypoxic zone’ in the Northern Gulf of Mexico. This can
stress and cause death in bottom-dwelling organisms, threatening the economic and
ecological health of one of the nation’s largest and most productive fisheries.
U.S. Geological Survey, Mississippi River Basin and Gulf of Mexico Hypoxia,
http://water.usgs.gov/nawqa/sparrow/gulf_findings/hypoxia.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). The
most definitive study of the causes concludes that runoff from agricultural sources contributes
70 percent of the excess nutrients. See Richard B. Alexander et al., Differences in Phosphorous
and Nitrogen Delivery to the Gulf of Mexico from the Mississippi River Basin, 42 Envtl. Sci. &
Tech. 822, 822 (2007), available at http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es0716103?cookieSet=1.
Hypoxia from agricultural runoff and urban sewage is expanding exponentially throughout the
world as well, affecting 400 estuarine systems covering over 245,000 square kilometers. See
Robert J. Diaz & Rutger Rosenberg, Spreading Dead Zones and Consequences for Marine
Ecosystems, 321 Sci. 926, 926 (2008); see generally Mindy Selman et al., Eutrophication
and Hypoxia in Coastal Areas: A Global Assessment of the State of Knowledge
(2008),
available
at
http://pdf.wri.org/eutrophication_and_hypoxia_in_coastal_areas.pdf
(reviewing instances and the science of estuarine eutrophication from around the world). For
additional discussion of agricultural runoff pollution and Gulf hypoxia, see infra Parts II–III and
V.
5. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
6. See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922-02, 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003). The EPA dismissed the petition on the broad basis that global
climate change is so complicated that either Congress did not provide for greenhouse gas
emissions to be subject matter for the Clean Air Act or, if Congress did so provide, the agency
properly identified conflicting policy concerns as a basis for deciding not to regulate emissions.
See id. at 52,929–31. For concise yet thorough summaries of the rulemaking petition, the EPA’s
decision, lower court proceedings, the Supreme Court’s majority and dissenting opinions, and the
likely impact of the case, see Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions From
Mobile Sources—Massachusetts v. EPA, 37 Envtl. L. Rep. 10535 (2007); Michael Sugar,
Comment, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 531
(2007).
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under the Clean Air Act.7 Among the many reasons the agency offered to
justify its decision was that no “realistic possibility exists that the relief
petitioners seek would mitigate global climate change and remedy their
injuries.”8 In other words, the EPA’s actions, no matter how draconian, could
not solve the global climate change problem. The problem was just too big for
one agency to handle.
The Court retorted that while the EPA could not hope to use its limited
capacity to solve the climate change problem completely, this did not justify
the agency’s inaction and disregard of a statutory mandate to regulate one of
the problem’s many causes. The Court observed that agencies do not “resolve
massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop. They instead whittle away at
them over time, refining their preferred approach as circumstances change and
as they develop a more-nuanced understanding of how best to proceed.”9 The
Court was clear in ordering the EPA to “whittle away” as best it could, yet
unhelpfully silent on how, exactly, the EPA should do so.10 The Court’s only
guidance was its observation that the “EPA no doubt has significant latitude as
to the manner, timing, content, and coordination of its regulations with those of

7. The Clean Air Act defines “air pollutant” in sweeping terms to include “any air
pollution agent . . . including any physical, chemical, [or] biological . . . substance or matter which
is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000). The Court found
that “greenhouse gases fit well within [this] capacious definition.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
8. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 523.
9. Id. at 524.
10. Given that the Court found that greenhouse gas emissions are pollutants under the
statute, the Clean Air Act charges the EPA with regulating greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles if in the EPA’s “judgment [the emissions] cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). Noting
that the Clean Air Act defines “welfare” to include “effects on . . . weather . . . and climate,” the
Court rejected all of the EPA’s proffered bases for its judgment not to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions. See Mass v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 506 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h)). Rather, the Court
concluded, under the clear terms of the Clean Air Act, the EPA can avoid taking further action to
regulate carbon emissions from motor vehicles “only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not
contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or
will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.” Id. at 533. As its only example of a
“reasonable explanation,” the Court suggested that the EPA might find “the scientific uncertainty
is so profound that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse
gases contribute to global warming.” Id. at 534. Yet having previously observed that “[r]espected
scientists” believe greenhouse gas emissions do contribute to climate change, id. at 504, the Court
seems to have left the EPA little wiggle room. See Jonathan Z. Cannon, The Significance of
Massachusetts v. EPA, 93 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 53, 59 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/
inbrief/2007/05/21/cannon.pdf (“The Court’s opinion seems to leave EPA little room in dealing
with climate change.”); Reitze, supra note 6, at 10538 (“[T]he Court’s opinion pushes EPA to find
that GHGs need to be regulated.”). Nevertheless, as a matter of judicial restraint the Court was
silent on how the EPA might go about fulfilling the decision, observing simply that “[w]e need not
and do not reach the question whether on remand EPA must make an endangerment finding, or
whether policy concerns can inform EPA’s actions in the event that it makes such a finding.”
Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 534–35.
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other agencies.”11 Simply put, the agency must figure out for itself how best to
whittle.12
This is no small task. Of course, the EPA is not alone in whittling away at
climate change. The Fish and Wildlife Service must protect a growing list of
species under the ESA.13 The Securities and Exchange Commission must
determine how public companies disclose potential effects of climate change on
their financial profiles.14 The Department of Transportation must take climate
change into account in setting fuel efficiency standards.15 State and local
energy, environmental, and land use agencies must consider how to account for
climate change when planning infrastructure and regulating facilities.16 How
11. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533.
12. The agency has yet to do this. In July 2008, the EPA announced it would delay its
decision on endangerment in order to solicit comments on an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking from the public and other federal agencies and state and local governments on options
for how to proceed. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed.
Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008) [hereinafter Regulating Greenhouse Gas]. EPA later found that
carbon emissions do pose an endangerment. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings
for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clear Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15,
2009). The agency also proposed rules to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from large industrial
sources in October 2009. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas
Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,291 (Oct. 27, 2009). No further regulatory actions have taken
place as of this writing.
13. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to
the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (2008) (describing ecological effects that climate change
will cause and their implications for administration of the ESA).
14. See Trisha L. Smith et al., Climate Change in SEC Disclosures: Charting a Course
Through Murky Waters Without a Compass, in Climate Change: Litigation, Regulation,
and Risk 21 (2008). Several institutional investors recently petitioned the Securities and
Exchange Commission to require companies to disclose more information and analysis of the
financial risks they face from climate change effects and the regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions. See California Public Employees Retirement System et al., Petition for Interpretive
Guidance on Climate Change Disclosure (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/
2007/petn4-547.pdf. Similarly, in 2008 the Attorney General of New York entered into
agreements with several energy companies requiring them to disclose increased financial,
regulatory, and litigation risks likely to be triggered by the impact of climate change on their plans
to construct coal-fired power plants. See John Herzfeld, Xcel Energy Agrees to Disclosure Plan
On Climate-Related Risk for Shareholders, Daily Env’t (BNA), Aug. 28, 2008, at A-8; see, e.g.,
In re Dynegy Inc., AOD 08-132 (N.Y. Att’y Gen’l 2008), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2008/oct/ dynegy_aod.pdf.
15. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d
508, 548–58 (9th Cir. 2007) (faulting the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration for
failing to take climate change effects into account when promulgating fuel economy standards for
light trucks and SUVs).
16. For summaries of proposed and adopted state and local climate change measures, see
John C. Dernbach & Seema M. Kakade, Climate Change Law: An Introduction, 29 Energy L.J.
1, 15–20 (2008); David Hodas, State Initiatives, in Global Climate Change & U.S. Law, 343–
369 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., ABA Press 2007); J.R. DeShazo and Jody Freeman, Timing and
Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1521–30
(2007); Stephen C. Jones & Paul R. McIntyre, Filling the Vacuum: State and Regional Climate
Change Initiatives, 38 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1640 passim (2007); Pew Center on Global
Climate Change, A Look at Emissions Targets, http://www.pewclimate.org/
what_s_being_done/targets (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). Many observers believe the measures are
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aggressively should each of these agencies whittle away? What types of knives
should they use? With all of this whittling, how do they avoid cutting each
other, much less come up with an agreed upon final carving?
Climate change is as big and unwieldy a problem as they come, so it is an
easy choice for poster child of the “massive problems” dilemma described by
the Court. But many problems, even those smaller in scope, present no less of a
challenge to public policy administration. As mentioned above, agriculture is
the nation’s leading source of water quality impairment, but its diffuse form of
nonpoint source pollution remains almost invulnerable to regulation.17 Urban
sprawl stretches public infrastructure to its limits, yet has defied all variety of
policy prescriptions.18 Global immigration and low-cost production have
altered the operation of our domestic labor market and have raised complex
human rights issues.19 The bursting of the subprime mortgage bubble has led to
fingers pointing in all directions.20 These are all massive problems with
unrealistic. See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, Free GHG Cuts: Too Good to be True?, Envtl. F., May–
June 2007, at 16 (asserting that the cost estimates California is providing for its greenhouse gas
reduction benchmark goals are wildly low).
17. In his comprehensive study of the problem, Halting Hypoxia, Jay Landers concludes
that “[t]o address hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico, the enormous amounts of nutrient entering the
water body via the Mississippi River must be reduced. Achieving this goal will require an array of
actions and strategies across a broad swath of America’s heartland.” Jay Landers, Halting
Hypoxia, Civ. Engineering, June 2008, at 54. For a legal analysis of agricultural nonpoint source
pollution, see J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27
Ecology L.Q. 263, 287–91 (2000) (examining the failure of legal measures to address
agricultural runoff).
18. As Robert Bruegmann concludes in his survey of sprawl’s history and the efforts to
arrest it, “a great many people have concluded . . . that sprawl is inevitable and that efforts to stop
it are doomed.” Bruegmann, supra note 3, at 220. For legal discussions of sprawl’s intractability,
see William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity,
68 Fordham L. Rev. 57, 64 (1999); Henry R. Richmond, Sprawl and Its Enemies: Why the
Enemies Are Losing, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 539 (2001). For the argument against the so-called
“inevitability theory” of sprawl, see Michael Lewyn, Sprawl in Europe and America (Aug. 1,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1194862. 17.1, p 147 and 17.2, 150.
19. See Lesley Wexler, The Non-Legal Role of International Human Rights Law in
Addressing Immigration, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. 359 (2007) (examining the causes and human
rights implications of the “recent migration explosion”).
20. One analysis concluded that “it is hard to overstate the extent of this reversal in
fortunes,” Securitisation—When it Goes Wrong, Economist, Sept 20, 2007, at 1, and another
suggested that “the regulators are trying to figure out how to work around it, but the Hill is going
to be in for one big surprise.” Gretchen Morgenson, Crisis Looms in Market for Mortgages, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 11, 2007, at 1 (quoting Josh Rosner). In a candid evaluation of how the problem
reached dimensions that outstripped the capacity of regulatory agencies, a former chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission observed that “as the markets grew larger and more
complex—in scope and in products offered—the commission failed to keep pace.” Julie
Hirschfield Davis, Former SEC Chief Says Agency Dropped Ball, USA Today, Oct. 17, 2008, at
5B (quoting Arthur Levitt). Among the gathering swirl of theories from pundits, the popular press,
and academics, a careful account of the anatomy of the rise and fall of the American subprime
mortgage market and its fallout around the globe comes from a Korean financial analyst, Man
Cho, who meticulously surveys the complex set of “key economic and institutional factors that
boosted the rise of the market, and those that contributed to the abrupt fall in 2007.” Man Cho,
Subprime Mortgage Market: Rise, Fall, and Lessons for Korea 3 (KDI Sch. of Pub. Policy &
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dimensions far beyond the capacity of any single agency to manage effectively.
In this Article we examine from both theoretical and practical perspectives
what it means for agencies to whittle away at massive problems such as these.
Conventional policy approaches, proposed both in administrative law
scholarship and in practice, to guide the design of regulatory institutions and
instruments have proven deeply inadequate when confronted by the
complexities of massive problems such as climate change, sprawl, and Gulf
hypoxia. A fundamentally different approach is needed, but it must be based on
a far clearer understanding of the nature and challenges of massive problems.
Part I of the Article explores what makes problems massive. The Court’s
observation that agencies have to whittle away at some problems is no doubt
accurate, but it raises three fundamental questions: which agencies should be
whittling, how should they proceed, and what exactly are they whittling. A
great deal of scholarship has focused on the first two questions,21 yet little
touches on the last. By contrast, we focus on the what question as the threshold
inquiry. In particular, we show that while all massive policy problems exhibit
large-number and large-scale attributes, what makes some particularly difficult
to address is the presence of cumulative effects—the complex accumulation of
economic, environmental, and social impacts from multiple sources. Policy
problems defined by large-scale cumulative effects may all appear massive
from a distance. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that different combinations of causal sources, causal mechanisms, and cumulative effects
lead to quite different types of massive problems, exhibiting different behavioral properties. As policy problems become even more massive due to cumulative
effects, the effectiveness of policy responses can change dramatically.
In Part II, therefore, we develop a framework to identify different types of
massive problems and their corresponding policy implications. Some massive
problems, such as wetlands loss, are relatively simple in structure; the clear
identification of sources and the proportionality of causal mechanisms lead to
readily manageable effects. Whittling away at these problems is easy. Some
massive problems, however, exhibit complicating factors such as highly diverse
and divergent sources, feedback loops between sources and effects, nonlinear
causal mechanisms, and temporal and spatial discontinuities between sources
and effects. As these factors become more dominant, simple solutions become
elusive. Whittling away gets harder.
When we probe the mechanisms of problems such as sprawl, we find
components operating at different spatial and temporal scales, with causal
feedback loops across and between scales. It is unlikely that any single level of
Mgmt. Paper No. 08-08, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1132976. For a probing
examination of the complexity of the causes and the proposed solutions, see John A. Tatom, The
U.S. Foreclosure Crisis: A Two-Pronged Assault on the U.S. Economy (Networks Fin. Inst.,
Working Paper No. 2008-WP-10, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1194975.
21. For discussion of the scholarship on these questions, see infra Part I.A.
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government is better positioned than any other to address that kind of problem.
Using sprawl and other examples from environmental and land use policy, we
create in Part II a typology of massive problems based on the different
properties that cumulative effects can exhibit. This framework makes clear why
problems that appear equally massive can differ dramatically in their core
attributes, which explains why some prove relatively easy to manage and others
mind-bogglingly intractable. The nature of the problem, in other words, has
much to say about an agency’s choice of whittling strategies.
Part III surveys how the law has addressed massive problems and their
cumulative effects mechanisms. With few exceptions, regulation has been
unimaginative, regarding all effects as homogeneous, linear, proportionally
aggregated, and thus easily whittled away at. Heavy reliance on cost-benefit
analysis, risk assessment, and predecision assessment—the mainstays of
agency analysis—has not proven useful in the face of certain types of massive
problems. By ignoring the particular cumulative causes of problems, therefore,
agencies may be whittling away, but with a blindfold on.
If conventional approaches to massive problems have been inadequate,
what should agencies do instead? In Part IV we consider strategies for whittling
away at massive problems. We demonstrate that conventional prescriptions to
match agency scale with problem scale and to choose instruments through costbenefit analysis offer little hope in the face of complex massive problems. An
agency acting solo with these tools will be no match for problems of massive
dimension. Instead, building on recent political science scholarship in the areas
of Dynamic Federalism,22 New Governance,23 and Transgovernmental
Networks, 24 we argue that agencies whittling away at massive problems must
be empowered to pool resources with other similarly charged agencies in
loosely linked “weak ties” networks that connect both institutions and people
within the institutions.
22. Scholars of Dynamic Federalism theory reject the “minimal overlap” model in which
there is a “particular allocation of at least primary regulatory authority between the states and the
federal government,” replacing it with one “in which multiple levels of government interact in the
regulatory process.” Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in
Environmental Law, 56 Emory L.J. 159, 161 (2006). More detail on Dynamic Federalism theory
is presented infra Part IV.B.
23. New Governance theory turns “away from the familiar model of command-style, fixedrule regulation by administrative fiat, and toward a new model of collaborative, multi-party, multilevel, adaptive, problem-solving” governance. Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in
Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 Minn.
L. Rev. 471, 473 (2004). More detail on New Governance theory is presented infra Part IV.B.
24. Transgovernmental Networks theory emphasizes the role of “networks of similarlysituated technocrats” who work in many different governance units, and “conceive[s] of
lawmaking as an organic enterprise, harnessing the technical expertise of bureaucrats who do not
possess heady titles but nonetheless intimately understand the practical exigencies of their
particular issue areas.” Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking:
The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 Yale J. Int’l L. 125, 182 (2005). More detail
on Transgovernmental Network theory is presented infra Part IV.B.

Ruhl.FINAL.doc (Do Not Delete)

2010]

3/19/2010 3:19 PM

MASSIVE PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

67

This can all sound rather abstract, so in Part V we get practical, presenting
a case study of the multiagency response to Gulf hypoxia. Legislatures granted
considerable policy discretion to the agencies participating in the effort,
creating space in which to design coordinated multiscale, multiagency policy
responses. In the absence of a legislatively issued master plan, each agency
adapted its particular response to facilitate the coordinated effort while
retaining full autonomy and accountability. The agencies working on solutions
to Gulf hypoxia demonstrate the type of networked strategy that our model
suggests is needed for agencies to best whittle away at massive problems. By
contrast, case studies from water management efforts in California and the
Chesapeake Bay reveal the pitfalls of coordinating through formally
institutionalized conglomerates of agency resources. Between solo agency
efforts and highly institutionalized multiagency coordination efforts lies the
sweet spot of personalized “weak ties” interagency networks that we believe is
best equipped to whittle away at massive problems. We conclude by setting out
the measures needed in administrative law to develop and endorse this new
form of multiagency coordination.
I
FRAMING THE MASSIVE PROBLEMS DILEMMA
It is not hard to find massive policy problems, nor is it hard to find public
calls to solve them. In this respect, massive problems are as much a political
challenge for legislatures as an administrative challenge for agencies.
Legislatures, however, have the luxury of issuing broad mandates to agencies
with equally broad delegations of discretion in implementing them.25
Appearing to do something, anything, but then passing on the tough choices to
the agency is an all-too-common practice in the face of policy problems of
massive dimensions.26 In this style of delegation, legislatures specify sets of
institutions and perhaps instruments, but largely leave to agencies the
responsibilities of developing the methodologies, such as model-building, and
25. Broad legislative delegation of authority to administrative agencies is a long-practiced
component of governance in the modern regulatory state which we take as a given, leaving the
normative question of whether the practice is consistent with constitutional separation of powers
and theories of legislative responsibility outside the scope of this Article. For examples of the vast
body of commentary on the ubiquity and inevitability of legislative delegations, see Steven P.
Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1
(1998); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89
Geo. L.J. 97 (2000). For examples of contrasting views of the propriety of legislative delegations,
compare David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20 Cardozo L.
Rev. 731 (1999) (arguing against delegation), with Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why
Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 81 (1985) (arguing in favor
of delegation).
26. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Balancing Mandate and Discretion in the Institutional
Design of Federal Climate Change Policy, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 196, 197 (2008)
(“Congress should vest more discretion in agencies to decide how to address climate change than
it does on the question of whether to do so.”).
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determining the final details of implementation and adaptation.27 Surely
legislatures can do better than simply giving agencies the authority to whittle
away and then hope for the best. Responding effectively to massive problems
requires an understanding of which agencies to enlist, the policies they should
adopt, and what specific aspects of the problems they should address—the
threshold questions of who should whittle away, how they should whittle away,
and what they should whittle away at.
A. The Threshold Questions of Whittling Away: Who, How, and What?
The question of who should whittle away falls under the broad umbrella of
federalism, and has motivated heated debate over the proper allocation of
federal and state authority, whether through centralization of authority in the
federal government, devolution of authority to state and local governments,
dualism’s separation of federal and state authority, or the middle ground of socalled “cooperative federalism.”28 A central premise of these and similar
analyses is that there is an appropriate level of government to take charge of the
problem, the key question being which level is best for a particular set of
circumstances. As Professors William Brock and Stephen Carpenter observe,
however, such thinking can lead to misguided policy “panaceas” that form
“when people think they have arrived at the truth regarding how the world
would work under different institutional designs and the design they propose is
optimal.”29

27. As Don Elliott describes the fate of agencies “tasked with solving emerging problems
without legislative guidance,” they must “adapt[] their statutes creatively to emerging problems by
seizing on bits and pieces of language or legislative history.” E. Donald Elliott, Portage Strategies
for Adapting Environmental Law and Policy During a Logjam Era, 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 24, 25
(2008).
28. “Centralized federalism suggests that the federal government should address
environmental problems on its own. Devolved federalism argues that environmental decisions are
best made at the state and local level. Dual federalism posits that each level of government should
have distinct and separate approaches to environmental regulation.” Benjamin K. Sovacool, The
Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal Action on Renewable
Energy and Climate Change, 27 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 397, 405 (2008). “[C]ooperative federalism is
a system of shared authority between federal and state governments” in which “state programs
adopt environmental standards at least as stringent as the federal program. . . . [and] the federal
government retains oversight authority.” David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive
Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 Minn. L.
Rev. 1796, 1811–12 (2008). Scholarly and judicial discussion of these different strands of
federalism theory is legion. For a thoughtful survey of “the ongoing tension between the oftvoiced judicial and scholarly preference for distinctly delineated federal and state roles and the
reality of overlapping federal and state roles that one finds [in] federalism’s central debates,” see
William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547, 1551 (2007).
29. William A. Brock & Stephen R. Carpenter, Panaceas and Diversification of
Environmental Policy, 104 Proc. Nat’l Acad. of Sci. 15206, 15206 (2007). For more on policy
panaceas, see Elinor Ostrom, A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas, 104 Proc.
Nat’l Acad. of Sci. 15181 (2007).
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For example, the well-known “matching principle” claims that “regulatory
authority should go to the political jurisdiction that comes closest to matching
the geographic area affected by a particular externality,”30 a maxim that has
gained considerable attention in administrative law scholarship.31 This precise
“problem-shed” approach would presumably subject climate change, for
example, to national and global governance, yet imposing such a level of
governance remains a hotly contested topic with vigorous arguments made for
matching climate change to regional, state, and local government scales as
well.32 Moreover, even if a particular level of government could be identified as
the optimal locus of regulatory authority, horizontal allocation of responsibilities would have to be made between federal agencies (if at the federal level),
between states (if at the state level), and between state and local agencies (also
if at the state level). Horizontal coordination between governments and
30. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The
Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 23, 53
(1996).
31. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 18, at 106–07 nn.202, 205; Daniel C. Esty, Good
Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 Yale L.J. 1490,
1493 (2006); Matthew D. Fortney, Devolving Control Over Mildly Contaminated Property: The
Local Cleanup Program, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1863, 1897–98 (2006).
32. Compare Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local
Climate Policies, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961, 1962 (2007) (“subnational state-level action is not the
best way to combat global climate change”), with Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate
Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 54 (2005) (outlining
means of implementing a “regional interstate cooperative approach”), with Hari M. Osofsky &
Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 Chi. J. Int’l L.
409 (2008) (arguing the advantages of a local jurisdiction “bottom-up networking” approach).
Some are of two minds, hoping for more federal regulation but recognizing the importance of
local, state, and regional regulation as, at the very least, catalysts for eventual federal regulation, if
not effective in their own right. See Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise
and Perils of the Piecemeal Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15
Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, 369, 401 (2006) (concluding that “[s]tate, regional, and local climate
change initiatives may be subject to criticism, but in light of the current federal regime, such
criticism may be unduly harsh.”); Stephen C. Jones & Paul R. McIntyre, Filling the Vacuum: State
and Regional Climate Change Initiatives, 30 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1640 (2007) (comparing the
paucity of federal initiatives to date with the proliferation of state and regional measures). Others
reject the state catalyst theory, arguing it will lead ultimately to a less effective federal response.
See Cary Coglianese & Jocelyn D’Ambrosio, Policymaking under Pressure: The Perils of
Incremental Responses to Climate Change, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1411 (2008); Benjamin K.
Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, The Hidden Cost of State Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS),
15 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 1 (2008). And yet others argue against federal preemption of state and local
initiatives and in favor of a “cooperative federalism” approach under which federal legislation sets
a preemptive “floor” of greenhouse gas emission standards above which states are free to regulate.
See William Andreen et al., Center for Progressive Reform, Cooperative Federalism
and Climate Change: Why Federal, State, and Local Governments Must Continue to
Partner (2008), available at www.progressivereform.org; Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E.
Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental
Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 579 (2008); Thomas D.
Peterson et al., Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Policy in the United
States that Fully Integrates Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 26 Va. Envtl. L.J. 227
(2008).
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agencies at any scale presents difficult questions of institutional choice and
cross-jurisdiction coordination.33 As problems become larger in scope and
complexity, crossing scales of governance and exceeding the capacity of any
particular agency at any particular scale, no obvious solution to the “which
agency” question presents itself. Indeed, massive problems may require an
altogether different and far more flexible way of thinking about federalism in
both its vertical and horizontal directions. In the terminology of Professor Hari
Osofsky, problems operating on massive scales may even require a “diagonal”
form of federalism.34
The second question—how agencies should whittle away at massive
problems—skirted by the Massachusetts v. EPA Court, presents a dilemma. At
one extreme, an agency could choose to act solely on its own, whittling away
hard and fast through maximum exercise of its regulatory power and without
any regard for other agencies. While such an agency would retain full
autonomy, it would also retain full accountability. The EPA, for example,
might use its Clean Air Act authority to clamp down hard on vehicles’
greenhouse gas emissions. The EPA’s actions undoubtedly would affect other
agencies’ policy measures and cause significant economic costs, yet not make a
noticeable dent in global greenhouse gas emissions. Whittling away hard and
fast in this way will likely not get an agency much credit for solving the
problem, but instead the agency would likely receive plenty of heat for the
policy and economic consequences. Why would any agency want to make so
many enemies for so little practical gain?
Alternatively, an agency could seek partners—other agencies with
regulatory jurisdiction over some aspect of the problem—in the hope that
collaboration would lead to greater results while spreading accountability for
the political and economic consequences.35 Finely tuned, efficiently
administered, strongly coordinated agency action is a worthy aspiration, but
unfortunately this idealized collaborative model is not easily attained in
33. For background on horizontal federalism, or “federalism without Washington,” and the
cross-jurisdiction coordination challenges it presents, see Ann O’M. Bowman, Horizontal
Federalism: Exploring Interstate Interactions, 14 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 535 (2004);
Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 493 (2008); Noah D. Hall, Toward a
New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 405 (2006).
34. See Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”: Litigation’s “Diagonal”
Regulatory Role, 49 Va. J. Int’l L. 585 (2009) (suggesting greater emphasis on connections
between governance institutions at different scales).
35. We use case studies of multiagency water management efforts in California (known as
CalFed) and the Chesapeake Bay to demonstrate this effect in Part V, infra. Our focus is on
collaboration primarily between numerous public agencies rather than between public agencies
and private stakeholders. For one of the seminal discussions of public-private collaboration as a
regulatory strategy, see Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1997). See also Eric W. Orts & Cary Coglianese, Debate: Collaborative
Environmental Law: Pro and Con, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 289 (2007) (a pointcounterpoint debate over public-private collaborative regulation).
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practice.36 The transaction costs of strong coordination, the differing internal
incentives of each agency, the loss of autonomy, and other collective action
challenges often overwhelm ambitions toward coordination. The collaboration
may devolve into the tragedy of the regulatory commons—each agency,
counting on others to do their part, free rides, thus leading to an ineffective
combined effort.37
Much administrative law and political science scholarship has focused on
techniques of solo and collaborative policy administration.38 Some scholars
address the solo method through economic models of optimal regulation using
cost-benefit analysis;39 some attempt to refine the collaborative method through
policy models of multiagency management;40 and some propose entirely new
models.41 While we believe there is much value in proposals that seek to
increase agencies’ effectiveness through efficiency and cooperation, scholars
have given little attention to the challenges an agency faces when dealing with
a problem with dimensions that far outstrip the agency’s regulatory capacity.42
As we demonstrate in Part IV, the crisp theories of cost-benefit analysis and
collaborative regulation that abound in administrative law scholarship have no
straightforward applications here.
Who should whittle away and how best to whittle away at massive
problems are, of course, critically important questions. However, the third
fundamental question suggested by Massachusetts v. EPA remains both

36. A recent example is the collapse of the CalFed multiagency collaborative process for
water resources planning in the Bay-Delta area of California. See Dave Owen, Law,
Environmental Dynamism, Reliability: The Rise and Fall of CALFED, 37 Envtl. L. 1145 (2007).
37. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1
(2003).
38. See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 Duke
L.J. 795 (2005) (reviewing different proposed approaches).
39. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State: The Future of
Regulatory Protection (2002). For a comprehensive critique of cost-benefit analysis, see
Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic
Reorientation, 32 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 433 (2008).
40. See, e.g., Freeman & Farber, supra note 38.
41. See, e.g., Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation, 71 Mod. L.
Rev. 59 (2008) (suggesting regulatory strategies that incorporate factors such as cognitive
frameworks of regulated firms).
42. Professor Bill Buzbee’s theory of the regulatory commons, with its attention to scale of
sources and effects for complex regulatory problems, is a notable exception. See Buzbee, supra
note 28, at 604–06. Climate change has, in particular, motivated increased attention to scalar
properties of problems as a driver of regulatory design. See Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change,
Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 825, 898–903 (2008) (using
Buzbee’s model to examine climate change, among other factors, as a driver of multiscalar
regulatory fragmentation in coastal and marine ecosystem contexts); Hari M. Osofsky, The
Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational Regulatory Governance,
83 Wash. U. L.Q. 1789, 1791–95 (2005) (using Buzbee’s model to identify an array of scalar
mismatches confounding efforts to regulate climate change causes). Our purpose is to advance this
line of thinking to a more formal model of how the spatial and temporal scales of cumulative
effects problems operate to confound regulatory strategy, and how best to respond.
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unanswered and largely overlooked by administrative law scholars—what
exactly should the agencies be whittling? These scholars are not alone in
avoiding a deeper analysis of the nature of massive policy problems. Neither
did the Supreme Court articulate the characteristics that comprise massive
problems, presumably assuming that one is much like another. Likewise,
political scientists have long grappled with so-called “wicked” problems, their
defining characteristic being that the solution of one aspect of the problem
reveals another, but have seldom deeply explored what makes a problem
“wicked.”43 Administrative law scholarship has only described massive legal
problems as “wicked” in passing.44 Even Professor Charles Lindblom’s
“incrementalism” theory from the late 1950s—the most influential critique of
“one-fell-swoop” approaches in which an agency attempts to wrestle a
“complex problem” under control with comprehensive policy measures—did
not explore what makes a policy problem complex.45 That massive problems
exist and that the law must deal with them is taken as a given;46 nevertheless,
administrative law has given little attention, in either scholarship or application,
to what exactly makes a problem “massive” (or “wicked” or “complex”) and,
as a consequence, so difficult to manage that agencies are resigned to whittling
away.
Perhaps a deeper understanding of the nature of massive problems is
unnecessary for purposes of effective policy design. Climate change and many
other policy problems appear massive from a distance, but so what? That they
cover large geographic areas and have large impacts may simply make them
bigger versions of smaller problems. If massive problems are no more complex

43. There is no fixed model of a “wicked” problem and no final outcome to solving the
problem short of running out of time or resources. See Donald Ludwig, The Era of Management Is
Over, 4 Ecosystems 758 (2001). The classic discussion is found in Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M.
Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 Pol’y Sci. 155, 160–67 (1973).
44. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1153 (2009) (discussing climate change
as a wicked problem for environmental lawmaking).
45. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 Pub. Admin. Rev.
79 (1959) [hereinafter Muddling Through]; Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet
Through, 39 Pub. Admin. L. Rev. 517 (1979). Lindblom critiqued what he called the “rational
comprehensive method” of public administration, offering in its place a model of incremental
policy making focused on “continually building out from the current situation, step-by-step and by
small degrees.” Lindblom, Muddling Through, supra, at 81. During its first twenty years,
Muddling Through had “been cited, re-cited, ex-cited, mal-cited, and well-cited,” to the point that
public administration academics and professionals considered the article’s impact on public policy
and administration to be “enormous.” Editorial, Here Comes Tomorrow, 39 Pub. Admin. Rev.
509, 509 (1979) (journal editorial introducing a symposium issue on the paper). Yet Lindblom
referred to “complex problems” repeatedly—over thirty times in his two primary articles—
without ever defining what makes a problem complex.
46. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Is There A There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. Land
Use & Envtl. L. 213, 253–54 (2004) (“environmental law will for the foreseeable future be a
messy process of adapting the contingencies and limitations of science to ‘wicked’ problems
informed by rebuttable principles.”).
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than large-scale versions of small-scale problems—larger in geographic reach
and economic scope but no different in causal properties—then policy models
that work well at small scales can be confidently “upscaled” without loss of
reliability in guiding policy design. To be sure, sheer scale does matter in terms
of institutional design and instrument choice, but there is more to massive
problems, we believe, than being “really big.” Once one takes a closer look at
the range of massive problems it becomes apparent that the causal mechanisms
for the aggregation of impacts differ substantially, and thus their
responsiveness to different regulatory approaches may differ substantially as
well. For many problems, with increases in scale come increases in complexity
of behavior. In those cases, policy models proven useful at smaller scales may
be less effective, useless, or even counterproductive. The nature of the
problem, in other words, has much to say about which agencies and methods to
employ for whittling away. In Part I.B, therefore, we begin a close examination
of the nature of massive problems.
B. The Attributes of Massive Problems
Consider the very names given to massive problems such as “sprawl” or
“climate change.” They capture the holistic sense of a cumulative effect arising
from a multitude of actions and actors, but offer no insight into how the effect
arose. What an agency really wants to know about sprawl, climate change, and
other massive problems is not only who and what are causing them, but which
policy responses will prove most effective in mitigating them. Any model of a
cumulative effects problem, therefore, must consider its causal sources, causal
mechanisms, and cumulative effects, for it is these attributes that determine
policy effectiveness.
1. Causal Sources
Massive problems usually have multiple, if not a multitude of, causal
sources. How responsive the sources are to policy instruments depends on a
range of factors, including the sources’ number, diversity, distribution, size,
and incentives. Formulating solutions to any massive problem depends in part
on an analysis of these source attributes. In the case of acid rain deposition, for
example, natural and anthropogenic emissions of sulfur dioxide (“SO2”) and
nitrogen oxides (“NOx”) react in the atmosphere with water, oxygen, and other
chemicals to form various acidic compounds.47 Prevailing winds blow these
47. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
“acid rain” is a broad term referring to a mixture of wet and dry deposition (deposited
material) from the atmosphere containing higher than normal amounts of nitric and
sulfuric acids. The precursors, or chemical forerunners, of acid rain formation result
from both natural sources, such as volcanoes and decaying vegetation, and man-made
sources, primarily emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx)
resulting from fossil fuel combustion. In the United States, roughly 2/3 of all SO2 and
1/4 of all NOx come from electric power generation that relies on burning fossil fuels,
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compounds across state and national borders, sometimes for hundreds of miles.
In the United States, this effect has been concentrated primarily in the
northeastern states, where it led to acidification of lakes and decay of building
materials.48 Almost 70 percent of nationwide SO2 emissions comes from the
generation of electric power.49 Most of these power plants are located in the
eastern half of the nation, and while there are thousands of them, a few hundred
plants account for a disproportionate share of emissions.50 In short, a significant
portion of SO2 emissions can be attributed to a small number of large, similar,
clustered, and easily identified sources.
One could reasonably expect in such circumstances that the sources, being
of similar size and in the same industry, would share an aligned incentive
structure in terms of responsiveness to external regulation, economic
conditions, and technological change.51 Altering source behavior thus becomes
a relatively straightforward policy undertaking. Indeed, one of the major
success stories of environmental regulation is the market-based “cap-and-trade”
emissions trading program introduced in the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air
Act; this program is credited with vastly reducing SO2 emissions from the
identified sources primarily because it played effectively into the pollution
sources’ shared incentive structures.52
By contrast, what is the source of sprawl? There are many sources, each
different in character, each contributing in a small way to the aggregate effect.
The placement of homes, roads, businesses, schools, sewer infrastructure, water
mains, and the like are both sources and manifestations of sprawl. The actors
contributing to sprawl—developers, financial institutions, planners, politicians,
transportation agencies, neighborhood groups, and a myriad of others—likely
have different, even inconsistent, incentive structures. A particular policy
measure may move interests in different directions, perhaps with offsetting
effects and unintended results.53 For example, when Florida first imposed
like coal. Acid rain occurs when these gases react in the atmosphere with water,
oxygen, and other chemicals to form variousacidic compounds. The result is a mild
solution of sulfuric acid and nitric acid. When sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides are
released from power plants and other sources, prevailing winds blow these compounds
across state and national borders, sometimes over hundreds of miles.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, What Is Acid Rain?, http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/what/
index.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2008).
48. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Acid Rain Program: 2004 Progress
Report 3 (2005).
49. Id. at 4.
50. See id. at 6–7.
51. See Jennifer Yelin-Kefer, Warming Up to an International Greenhouse Gas Market:
Lessons from the U.S. Acid Rain Experience, 20 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 221, 243 (2001) (discussing
the strong preexisting relationships and common interests of the domestic utilities subject to the
Acid Rain Program).
52. See Joseph Goffman, Title IV of the Clean Air Act: Lessons for Success of the Acid
Rain Emissions Trading Program, 14 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 177 (2006). For an overview of
the program’s structure and operation, see Yelin-Kefer, supra note 51, at 234–41.
53. As Bruegmann observes, “When it comes to setting public policy about anything as
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transportation concurrency measures requiring localities to limit development
to areas where transportation infrastructure was adequate, developers
responded by moving into rural areas where road capacity was more than
adequate.54 The sprawl-reducing intent of the policy measure actually
contributed to more sprawl—an isolated but telling lesson that the source of
sprawl is a complex mix of factors. Attempts to pin it down have been, in the
words of one acid commentator, “remarkably varied and contradictory.”55
We could describe similar stories for climate change, Gulf hypoxia, and
other cumulative effects problems. As a general matter, the potential for policy
effectiveness will increase when (1) there are fewer causal sources, (2) the
sources are not very diverse, (3) the distribution of the sources is clustered, (4)
the size of each source is large relative to the scope of the problem, and (5) the
sources’ incentive structures are uniform and aligned. These attributes are set
out in Table 1 below, and map well onto both urban sprawl and acid rain.
Table 1: The Impact of Causal Source Attributes on Policy Effectiveness
Source Attribute

Number
Diversity
Distribution
Size Relative to Effects
Incentive Structure

Higher Policy
Effectiveness
(e.g., acid rain)
Low
Low
Clustered
Large on average
Uniform and aligned

Lower Policy
Effectiveness
(e.g., urban sprawl)
High
High
Dispersed
Small on average
Mixed and inconsistent

2. Causal Mechanisms
Even in the best of worlds when all source attributes line up for achieving
effective policy measures, solving massive problems will not necessarily be
easy. One must also consider the causal mechanisms that link sources with
effects. If the causal mechanisms are large in scale or have significant time
lags, or if the causal chain is complex, then designing effective policy measures
may be difficult regardless of how simple it is to identify the sources.
Again, acid rain provides a nice example. As discussed above, SO2
emissions from power plants clustered in one region of the country increased
acidic compound concentration in the atmosphere, which prevailing winds
complex as sprawl . . . the ‘solution’ to any given problem depends on the vantage point of the
person doing the proposing.” Bruegmann, supra note 3, at 222.
54. Thomas G. Pelham, A Historical Perspective for Evaluating Florida’s Evolving Growth
Management Process, in Growth Management in Florida: Planning for Paradise 7, 17
(Timothy S. Chapin et al., eds., Ashgate 2008). A similar “leapfrog” effect was induced by growth
boundaries the city of Seattle imposed. See Nancy B. Grimm, Global Change and the Ecology of
Cities, 319 Sci. 756 (2008).
55. Bruegmann, supra note 3, at 96.
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carried to another part of the country. The causal area of the “problem-shed”
was regionally well defined, the chemical and atmospheric conditions played
out as fast as the chemical reactions and winds would allow, the relationship
between SO2 emissions and acidified conditions eventually was wellunderstood, and technology was readily available to reduce emissions. All of
these factors reinforced the effectiveness of making a policy design based on
market mechanisms.56
Climate change presents a far more complicated causal scenario.57 To be
sure, the fundamental causal mechanism of the “greenhouse effect” is well
understood: carbon dioxide and other tropospheric aerosols allow solar energy
to reach the surface but trap heat energy radiating back from the surface,
leading surface temperatures to rise.58 The causal scenario, however, extends
from global to local, vastly increasing the number of governance units affected
as well as the number needed to formulate effective responses. The timing of
the causal mechanism, moreover, is protracted. The rising temperatures of
today are the lagged result of net increases in emissions from decades ago, and
the even higher amounts of emissions today will likely lead to higher
temperatures well in the future.59 For centuries after net anthropogenic
emissions turn the corner toward reductions, if they ever do, this “committed
warming” means surface temperatures will continue rising, making it difficult
to link present, and potentially costly, regulatory measures with success.60

56. See Yelin-Kefer, supra note 51, at 235–39. It is generally regarded that “[t]he SO2
allowance trading program has performed successfully” in that “[t]argeted emissions reductions
have been achieved and exceeded, and total abatement costs have been significantly less than what
they would have been in the absence of trading provisions.” Robert N. Stavins, Lessons Learned
from SO2 Allowance Trading, 20 Choices 53, 53 (2005).
57. For a thorough comparison of the two problems, see Yelin-Kefer, supra note 51,
passim.
58. This causal chain as well as other primary and secondary drivers, both natural and
anthropogenic, are covered in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary
for Policymakers, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of
Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change 10–17 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC Summary], available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf.
59. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for
Policymakers, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability,
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 19 (2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf (“Past emissions are
estimated to involve some unavoidable warming . . . even if atmospheric greenhouse gas
concentrations remain at 2000 levels”); V. Ramanathan & Y. Feng, On Avoiding Dangerous
Anthropogenic Interference with the Climate System: Formidable Challenges Ahead, 105 Proc.
of the Nat’l Acad. of Sci. 14245 (2008) (estimating committed warming of 2.4oC even if
greenhouse gas concentrations are held to 2005 levels); Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate
Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 Proc. of the Nat’l Acad. of Sci. 1704 (2009)
(estimating a thousand-year committed warming effect).
60. For an in-depth examination of this lag effect and the resistance it is likely to generate
against costly policy measures that may take decades to produce results, see Eric Biber, The Sting
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Furthermore, there are numerous sources and sinks of greenhouse gas
emissions, with properties that vary in response to environmental conditions.61
The causal chains in these sinks and sources are complex, nonlinear,
intertwined, and attenuated, making it difficult to tell a simple A leads to B
story of the causal mechanisms.62
As a general matter, then, policy effectiveness will improve when (1) the
scale of causal mechanisms is more spatially confined, (2) the timing of the
causal mechanisms is more temporally confined, and (3) the causal chain from
source to effect is more proportional and direct. These conditions allow a
smaller number of governance units to coordinate the response and test the
effectiveness of policy measures under real time conditions.

of the Long Tail: Climate Change, Backlash and the Problem of Delayed Harm (UC Berkeley
Public Law Research Paper No. 1292529, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1292529.
61. See U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, The First State of the Carbon Cycle Report (SOCCR): The North
American Carbon Budget and Implications for the Global Carbon Cycle 5-9 (2007).
62. See, e.g., U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, Thresholds of Climate Change in
Ecosystems (2009) (examining numerous positive feedback properties leading to nonlinear
thresholds in climate change dynamics); Gordon B. Bonan, Forests and Climate Change:
Forcings, Feedbacks, and the Climate Benefits of Forests, 320 Sci. 1444 (2008) (explaining the
complex and nonlinear forest-climate interactions); I. Eisenman & J.S. Wettlaufer, Nonlinear
Threshold Behavior During the Loss of Arctic Sea Ice, 106 Proc. of the Nat’l Acad. of Sci. 28
(2009) (describing the nonlinear “tipping points” in the ice-albedo feedback effect); Jerome
Gaillardet & Albert Galy, Himalaya—Carbon Sink or Source?, 320 Sci. 1727 (2008) (explaining
the uncertainties of the sinks and sources of the carbon geological cycle); Steven W. Running,
Ecosystem Disturbance, Carbon, and Climate, 321 Sci. 652 (2008) (explaining the uncertainties
of ecological sinks and sources such as fires and insect epidemics). Dust, pollutant haze, and other
aerosols in the atmosphere, for example, deflect incoming solar radiation and thus have a cooling
effect. See Richard A. Kerr, Another Global Warming Icon Comes Under Attack, 317 Sci. 28, 28
(2007) (explaining that because “[a]erosols cool the planet by reflecting away sunlight and
increasing the reflectivity of clouds,” climate change models can vary widely depending on
assumptions about aerosol levels). As temperatures rise on average, moreover, other positive and
negative feedback effects are triggered that could amplify or impede further warming. Melting
tundra, for example, releases more greenhouse gases, and researchers have found this effect is far
exceeding expected levels because of its feedback properties. See Katey M. Walter et al., Methane
Bubbling from Siberian Thaw Lakes as a Positive Feedback to Climate Warming, 443 Nature
71, 71 (2006). The effect leads to a positive feedback loop in the following manner: as the
greenhouse gases are released, they contribute to warming that melts the tundra faster, which
releases more greenhouse gases more rapidly, and so on. See Katey M. Walter et al., Methane
Bubbling from Northern Lakes: Present and Future Contributions to the Global Methane Budget,
365 Phil. Transactions of the Royal Soc’y A 1657, 1671 (2007). This effect is believed to
have played a significant role in the last deglaciation. See Katey M. Walter et al., Thermokarst
Lakes as a Source of Atmospheric CH4 During the Last Deglaciation, 318 Sci. 633, 633 (2007).
Ecologists believe these and other transformations in the tundra “could be a one-way ticket.” John
Bohannon, The Big Thaw Reaches Mongolia’s Pristine North, 319 Sci. 567, 568 (2008).
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Table 2: The Impact of Causal Mechanism Attributes
on Policy Effectiveness
Causal Attribute

Scale

Higher Policy
Effectiveness
(e.g., acid rain)
Local or regional

Timing
Relationship

Immediate
Proportional and direct

Lower Policy
Effectiveness
(e.g., climate change)
Multiscalar: local to
global
Protracted
Nonlinear and complex

3. Cumulative Effects
Cumulative effects—the manner in which effects build up over time and
space—will also influence the effectiveness of policies directed at massive
problems. Some cumulative effects problems, such as Gulf hypoxia, can be
shown on a map and measured with relative precision,63 whereas others, such
as sprawl, are difficult to identify and must be measured indirectly with
disparate data such as commute times, traffic jams, and bike lane miles.64 Some
cumulative effects, such as the impact of climate change on ecosystems, are
subject to nonlinear tipping points that punctuate changes in aggregation and
disaggregation rates.65 This nonlinear pattern makes it harder to link policy
measures with changes in cumulative effects within relevant political time
frames. And of course the ultimate question is how reversible the effects are,
for even the simplest scenario of causal sources and mechanisms does little
good if the effects are irreversible. For example, less nutrient runoff from farms
in the Midwest will lead directly to less Gulf hypoxia; the effects are easily
reversible. By contrast, if the tundra permafrost thaws before we turn the corner
on rising surface temperatures, as it appears likely to do, there is no putting it
back together the way it once was.66

63. See Diaz & Rosenberg, supra note 4 (analyzing over 400 hypoxia zones globally).
64. Bruegmann discusses “the difficulty of pinning down a common definition or linking it
to realities on the ground.” Bruegmann, supra note 3, at 3. Numerous scholarly, interest group,
and media efforts have been aimed at defining a “sprawl index,” with many different criteria and
methodologies being proposed. See e.g., George Galster et al., Wrestling Sprawl to the Ground:
Defining and Measuring an Elusive Concept, 12 Housing Pol’y Debate 681 (2001); Russ Lopez
& H. Patricia Hynes, Sprawl in the 1990s: Measurement, Distribution, and Trends, 38 Urb. Aff.
Rev. 325 (2003); see also Haya El Nasser & Paul Overberg, A Comprehensive Look at Sprawl in
America, USA Today, Feb. 22, 2001, at 1A. One interest group, Smart Growth America, issued a
sprawl index report, see Reid Ewing et al., Measuring Sprawl and Its Impact (2002), and an
Internet site at which people can find their metropolitan area’s rank. See Smart Growth America,
Measuring Sprawl and Its Impact: The Character & Consequences of Metropolitan Expansion,
2009, available at http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/sprawlindex/Measuring Sprawl.pdf.
65. See R.B. Alley et al., Abrupt Climate Change, 299 Sci. 2005 (2003); Stephen H.
Schneider, Abrupt Non-linear Climate Change, Irreversibility and Surprise, 14 Global Envtl.
Change 245 (2004).
66. See Bohannon, supra note 62. For other examples of ecological thresholds of
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In general, one can expect that policies will be more effective when
cumulative effects are (1) easily identified and (2) measured, (3) proportional
over time and (4) space, and (5) reversible. These attributes make it easier to
model and evaluate different policy responses and to mobilize support for
measures that are demonstrably successful across relevant spatial and temporal
scales.
Table 3: The Impact of Cumulative Effects Attributes on Policy
Effectiveness
Effects Attribute

Detection
Metrics
Spatial Distribution
Temporal Distribution
Reversibility

Higher Policy
Effectiveness
(e.g., hypoxia)
Easy to identify
Easy to measure
Proportional
Proportional
High

Lower Policy
Effectiveness
(e.g., biodiversity loss)
Difficult to identify
Difficult to measure
Patchy and disproportional
Punctuated and nonlinear
Low

II
CONSTRUCTING A TYPOLOGY OF MASSIVE PROBLEMS
Part I.B identified the significant attributes of massive problems. This is
analytically important for two reasons. First, it shows why not all massive
problems are the same. Two problems that appear equally massive in scale may
be dramatically different depending on the nature of their causal sources, causal
mechanisms, and cumulative effects. As a result, and second, by focusing on
the particular attributes of a problem we can now understand why some
massive problems are more responsive to policy interventions than others. This
model says little, however, about which policies will most effectively address
massive problems, returning us to the original question of what agencies should
whittle away. For that, we need a different model.
Therefore, in Part II, we focus not on the attributes of massive problems
but, rather, on their behavior. We examine how the cumulative effects of
different kinds of massive problems manifest in the real world. Using practical
examples to illustrate the analysis, we show which problems are most
responsive to policy interventions and why. This Part presents a typology,
summarized in the table below, which builds up from the simplest to the most
complex cumulative effects problem, identifying the relevant policy
implications of each.

irreversibility that climate change is likely to cross, see U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program,
Thresholds of Change in Ecosystems (2009), available at http://www.climatescience.gov/
Library/sap/sap4-2/public-review-draft.
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Table 4: Typology of Massive Problems
Problem Type
Simple
Aggregation
Spaghetti Bowl
Feedback
Discontinuity
Policy Jungle

Aggregation Properties
Things add up proportionally in all
dimensions
Different sources respond to different and
potentially offsetting incentives
Different sources, causal mechanisms, or
effects interact with one another
Large, often nonlinear spatial or temporal
gaps between sources and impacts
All these attributes mixed together

Example
Wetlands loss
Ocean
governance
Biofuels
Gulf hypoxia
Climate change

A. Simple Aggregation Problems
The behavior of some cumulative effects is straightforward, characterized
by proportionality and ease of detection and measurement. The loss of wetland
resources in the United States, for example, has been a story of very small
incremental losses gradually accumulating over time into a staggering loss of
resources on landscape scales, first from conversion to agricultural land uses
and later from conversion to urban land uses.67 Wetlands were perceived as
worthless swamps and wasted development opportunities for most of our
history; as a result few Americans would shed a tear over the loss of an acre of
wetlands here and another there.68 But over time the cumulative ecological
effect of these losses became significant.69 Wetlands provide valuable services
to human populations, such as flood modulation, groundwater recharge,
nutrient and sediment capture, and storm surge protection.70 As Hurricane
Katrina made all too evident, cumulative wetland loss along the Gulf coast
67. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has estimated that the contiguous forty-eight states
lost over half their wetlands land cover from the time of European settlement until the 1990s,
going from over 200,000 million acres to just over 100,000 million acres. Claudia Copeland &
Jeffrey A. Zinn, Congressional Research Service, Wetlands: An Overview of Issues 5
(2006). Conversion to agriculture accounts for over 80 percent of those losses, but in the past
several decades loss to urbanization has taken over as the leading cause of wetland resource
losses. Id. at 14. See also U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Status and Trends of Wetlands
in the Coterminous United States 1998-2004 15, 47 (2006) [hereinafter Status and
Trends].
68. Consider a popular 1957 children’s book, Dear Garbage Man, which tells the
supposedly happy story of how garbage was used: “That night as the city slept, the tugboats
chugged and whistled softly as they pulled the barges down the river. The trash and ashes they
carried would be used to fill in swampland. Then parks and playgrounds would be built there.”
Gene Zion, Dear Garbage Man (1957).
69. For example, even during the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, national
wetland losses exceeded 450,000 acres annually. See Status and Trends, supra note 67, at 15.
70. See Brant Keller, What We Always Knew: Wetlands Win Hands Down at Pollution
Mitigation, 27 Nat’l Wetlands Newsl., Sept–Oct 2005, at 12; Sandra Postel & Stephen
Carpenter, Freshwater Ecosystem Services, in Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on
Natural Ecosystems 195 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., Island Press 1997).
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degraded these services and led to loss of life and property.71 The ecological
and economic effects of wetland resources depletion, while perhaps imperceptible at first, have become distressingly obvious in many parts of the nation.
Although the ecology of wetlands is complex, the underlying policy
problem is not, and it is not necessary to understand everything about wetlands
to slow or even halt their loss. We can identify and map wetlands relatively
easily, and thus record their losses and gains over time.72 We can also detect,
measure, and monitor the behaviors leading to their loss—conversion to
agriculture and urban land uses.73 Restoration of stressed wetlands can reverse
many of the damages suffered, and is an increasingly feasible technique.74
Regulatory responses need not be complex either. Regulation has
restricted development of wetlands and mandated compensation for conversion
of wetland resources with the goal of “no net loss” of wetlands.75 Section 404
of the Clean Water Act (“Section 404”) provides the regulatory intervention at
the national level for the lion’s share of wetland resources, requiring regulated
entities proposing to fill wetlands to obtain a permit from the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (“the Corps”).76 The Corps, in turn, has administered a program of
compensatory mitigation, requiring permittees who fill wetlands at one location
to restore or enhance similar wetlands at another location, to achieve the no net
loss goal.77 While the agency has no shortage of critics,78 over the past thirty
years the Corps’s implementation of this regulatory program has achieved

71. See Environmental Law Institute, After the Storm: Restoring America’s
Gulf Coast Wetlands, A Special Report of the National Wetlands Newsletter (Gwen
Arnold ed., Envtl. L. Inst. 2006). Not surprisingly, the most economically destructive flooding in
New Orleans was on prior coastal wetland areas that had been drained and developed. See Nature
Destroys, But It Also Can Protect, The Envtl. F., Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 18.
72. See, e.g., Status and Trends, supra note 67, at 24–36.
73. See id. at 39–41.
74. See id. at 81–87.
75. See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594,
19,594 (Apr. 10, 2008) (describing “no net loss” of wetlands as a longstanding national goal
guiding federal policy).
76. 33 U.S.C. 1344(a) (2000). For background on the wetlands regulation program, see
Wetlands law and Policy: Understanding Section 404 (Kim Dana Connolly, Stephen M.
Johnson & Douglas R. Williams eds., American Bar Association Publishing 2005). The Corps
evaluates over 85,000 permits annually. See Copeland & Zinn, supra note 67, at 7.
77. For a history and overview of the wetland compensatory mitigation program, see
Envtl. Law Inst., Banks and Fees: The Status of Off-Site Mitigation in the United
States (2002).
78. See, e.g., Nat’l Research Council, Compensating for Wetland Losses Under
the Clean Water Act (2001); Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-898,
Wetlands Protection: Corps of Engineers Does Not Have and Effective Oversight
Approach to Ensure that Compensatory Mitigation Is Occurring (2005). For
comprehensive discussions of concerns expressed about the wetlands mitigation program, see
Rebecca L. Kihslinger, Success of Wetland Mitigation Projects, 30 Nat’l Wetlands Newsl.,
Mar.–Apr. 2008, at 14; James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of
Environmental Law, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 607, 657–68 (2000).
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considerable reductions of annual net wetland resource loss.79
To be sure, achieving no net loss of wetland resources has not been as
easy as flipping a switch. The wetlands loss problem—though simple in terms
of its causal source, causal mechanism, and cumulative effects attributes—is
nonetheless massive. The sheer dimension of the problem’s source attribute,
many wetlands that are widely spread out, has made it unwieldy in some
important respects. For example, the problem does not map perfectly onto one
institutional structure, as not all wetlands are subject to federal jurisdiction80
and state and local programs vary considerably.81 Also, different kinds of
wetlands can provide different benefits at different scales. This variability has
led to debate over how to conduct the no net loss calculus82 and to concerns
that compensatory mitigation has caused an undesirable shifting of wetland
resource location and a less-than-full replacement of ecological and economic
values.83
Even relatively simple aggregation policy problems can present significant governance challenges when they reach massive scales. But the central
point is that these problems are responsive to straightforward regulation if the
political will is there to address them meaningfully. The specific policy
responses can be refined over time to adjust to initial mistakes and to improve
performance because it is easy to measure the relationship between cause and
effect. With experience it may be possible to isolate attributes that cause the
problem to deviate from the ideal simple aggregation model; policy can then
focus on those attributes. The Corps, for example, recently took the lessons
learned from the past several decades of administering compensatory mitigation and used them to overhaul the program in a comprehensive rulemaking.84
The program’s basic focus, however, remains on maintaining the quantity and
quality of wetlands. The fact that this is a simple aggregation problem has made
this strategy effective at reducing the rate of wetland losses.85
79. Wetlands land cover saw a slight net gain during the period from 1998–2004. See
Status and Trends, supra note 67, at 46.
80. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (describing criteria for limiting
federal jurisdiction); see generally Symposium, Rapanos v. United States, 22 Nat. Resources &
Env’t, Summer 2007, at 1 (series of articles exploring the rationales for and potential
consequences of the decision).
81. See Turner Odell, On Soggy Ground—State Protection for Isolated Wetlands, 25 Nat’l
Wetlands Newsl., Sept.–Oct. 2003, at 7 (evaluating effectiveness of state programs in
addressing nonfederal wetlands).
82. For example, the 2006 Status and Trends study has been criticized for including farm
stock ponds, golf course ponds, and urban storm water control ponds in its count of freshwater
wetland acres. See Copeland & Zinn, supra note 67, at 5.
83. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman, The Effects of Wetland Mitigation Banking on
People, 28 Nat’l Wetlands Newsl., Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 1.
84. See 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594 (Apr. 10, 2008) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 325, 332; 40 C.F.R.
pt. 230).
85. See Susan-Marie Stedman & Thomas E. Dahl, Coastal Wetlands of the Eastern United
States: 1998-2004 Status and Trends, 30 Nat’l Wetlands Newsl., July-Aug. 2008, at 4, 18, 19–
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B. Spaghetti Bowl Problems
The first variation on the simple aggregation model, which we call the
spaghetti bowl problem, is a subtle yet significant move. Some cumulative
effects are in fact an amalgam of independent, simple aggregation problem
“strands.” Between these strands, the sources may differ substantially in terms
of incentive structure or direction of responses. To push the metaphor to its
limits, it is as if the strands are all different kinds of pasta. If all the strands
empty into one bowl, however, it may be difficult to identify and define the
problem as something other than a pile of pasta. Moreover, because of differing
and sometimes offsetting source incentive structures a policy response aimed at
the most visible strand may not produce results or ground may even be lost, as
it in fact matters how each individual strand behaves in response to the policy.
The solution to the overall massive problem thus must take into account each of
the strands.
The central policy challenge for this type of cumulative effects problem
thus becomes one of perception—the ability to divide the strands into their
separate identities. Once that clarity is achieved, independent policy responses
may be crafted for each individual strand. This approach thus takes advantage
of the feature that all strands combine their effects into one aggregate bowl. As
traction is gained on each problem, the bowl of cumulative effects becomes less
full and the massive problem is slowly whittled away.
An example of this kind of policy vision comes from Professor Josh
Eagle’s insightful treatment of one of the environment’s classic “bowls” of
cumulative effects—the oceans.86 As Eagle notes, two recent high-level
assessments of our nation’s marine ecosystems suggest they are in grave peril,
the victims of a massive problem.87 The policy response that both assessments
recommend, logically it may seem, is the “establishment of larger scale, more
‘comprehensive’ management bodies,” on the premise that “present institutions
are too narrow in their geographic and substantive scope.”88
Eagle contends that this policy response is ill-advised because the poor
condition of the oceans is largely a function of the “multiple-use” mandate
under which present management agencies operate, which forces them to
manage all ocean resources so as to serve a wide array of objectives and
interests.89 The problem with the multiple-use mandate, according to Eagle, is
that many marine resource uses are directly incompatible, and thus balancing
them into multiple-use harmony across the ocean resource is fundamentally not

20 (losses of eastern freshwater, estuarine, and marine wetlands were less than 1 percent over the
six-year period).
86. See Josh Eagle, Regional Ocean Governance: The Perils of Multiple-Use Management
and the Promise of Agency Diversity, 16 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 143 (2006).
87. See id. at 143–45.
88. Id. at 146.
89. See id. at 157–58.
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a viable objective.90 Broadening the multiple-use mandate and applying it more
comprehensively over the ocean resource thus “has the potential to exacerbate
those problems.”91 Rather, he argues, ocean policy should rely on a set of
“dominant-use” agencies, each tied to achieving a particular objective in a
specified “use-priority” zone, such as fishing, recreation, or conservation.92
Eagle’s proposal recognizes a spaghetti bowl problem. The condition of
the oceans is a cumulative effects problem, but the various strands in the bowl
exhibit different attributes. The metapolicy approach of comprehensive
multiple-use management has tried to pick up all the strands at once, whereas
Eagle is suggesting we manage the problem strand-by-strand, given their
potentially offsetting incentive structures. Because the ocean is physically like
a bowl, he proposes separating the strands through political demarcation of
priority-use zones and institutional division of dominant-use agencies. While
this surely does not solve all the details—fish can swim between zones; some
of the strands may exhibit numerous low-tractability attributes; interagency
coordination will be needed to achieve efficient overall expenditure of
governance resources—his “agency diversity” proposal should improve the
chances that policy responsive strands can be addressed and that more difficult
strands can be isolated for focused policy management.
C. Feedback Problems
One of the complications with Eagle’s agency diversity proposal for
oceans management suggested above in Part II.B is the possibility of feedback
among strands when different policy responses are applied to them. In other
words, the strands may not be entirely independent from one another. Rather,
there may be interrelations and interdependencies between the strands such that
regulating one strand may affect the nature and tractability of others. Increased
fish stocks from successful regulation of commercial fishing, for example,
might prompt increased recreational fishing, and vice versa. Moreover,
feedback effects may spill out of the bowl, so to speak, so that overall success
in managing the bowl nonetheless leads to external policy problems. For
example, regulating recreational fishing operations could affect local economies dependent on this activity for their income.
Potential feedback may be a significant complication for massive
problems and responses like Eagle’s “agency-diversity” approach. If there is
feedback between the different strands unraveled from the spaghetti bowl, each
dominant-use agency working in its priority-use zones may not see, or even
care, about the feedback loops.93 An agency that achieves “success” under a
90. See id. at 158–62.
91. Id. at 147.
92. See id. at 166–76.
93. This is reminiscent of the “Tunnel Vision” problem Justice Breyer has written about in
risk management. Stephen Breyer, Breaking The Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk
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dominant-use mandate may nevertheless add to the challenges that a different
dominant-use agency experiences in managing its own priority-use zone. If the
latter agency reacts to these new challenges and the subsequent effects of its
actions spill over into the first agency’s domain, the two agencies may
unknowingly become engaged in a runaway policy arms race with mutually
assured destruction of the base resource as the endpoint.
The nation’s biofuels initiative is a current policy example with all the
ingredients for this kind of feedback problem.94 The initiative is designed to
reduce dependence on petroleum and thereby reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The problem is that “biofuel sustainability has environmental, economic, and
social facets that all interconnect. Tradeoffs among them vary widely by types
of fuels and where they are grown and, thus, need to be explicitly considered by
using a framework that allows the outcomes of alternative systems to be
consistently evaluated and compared.”95 By forgoing this consideration, the
initiative’s initial focus on corn as the feedstock has set in motion land use
changes that may actually increase greenhouse gas emissions,96 not to mention
increasing soil erosion and water use,97 inflating world food prices,98 inducing
farmers to exit federal land conservation programs,99 and causing other
feedback effects that spill well outside the scope of the policy initiative.100

Regulation (1993).
94. For background on the federal and state legislative and regulatory initiatives, see L.
Leon Geyer et al., Ethanol, Biomass, Biofuels and Energy: A Profile and Overview, 12 Drake J.
Agric. L. 61 (2007); Peter Z. Grossman, If Ethanol Is the Answer, What Is the Question?, 13
Drake J. Agric. L. 149 (2008); Arnold W. Reitze, Should the Clean Air Act Be Used to Turn
Petroleum Addicts into Alcoholics?, 36 Envtl. L. Rep. 10754, 10756 (2006).
95. G. Philip Robertson et al., Sustainable Biofuels Redux, 322 Sci. 49, 49 (2008).
96. See Dan Charles, Corn-Based Ethanol Flunks Key Test, 324 Sci. 587 (2009) (land
clearing to produce feedstock will increase greenhouse gas emissions); Joseph Fargione et al.,
Land Clearing and the Biofuel Carbon Debt, 319 Sci. 1235 (2008); Timothy Searchinger et al.,
Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from LandUse Change, 319 Sci. 1238 (2008).
97. See National Academy of Sciences, Water Implications of Biofuels
Production in the United States (Oct 2007); David Pimintel, Ethanol Fuels: Energy Balance,
Economics, and Environmental Impacts are Negative, 12 Nat. Resources Res. 127 (2003);
Stanley Mubako & Christopher Lant, Water Resources Requirements of Corn-Based Ethanol, 44
Water Resources Res. (2007).
98. See William F. Laurance, Switch to Corn Promotes Amazon Deforestation, 318 Sci.
1721 (2007) (discussing rising soy and beef prices).
99. See James Pease & Thomas Simpson, Corn Grain Ethanol and Water Quality in the
Chesapeake Bay Watershed, 30 Nat’l Wetlands Newsl., Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 1 (discussing this
effect).
100. These and other effects are comprehensively discussed in Rudolf M. Smaling,
Environmental Barriers to Widespread Implementation of Biofuels, 2 Envt’l & Energy L. &
Pol’y Rev. 287, 295–305 (2007).
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D. Discontinuity Problems
If the sources are in one region but the effects are felt in another or if the
impact of aggregation is not felt until long after the sources have set the causal
chain in motion, then classic transboundary and intertemporal policy
complications, also known as discontinuities, come into play. Discontinuities
can also involve scale, such as when the sources are small and scattered but the
effects are large and concentrated or when a small number of actors in one
generation causes widely dispersed effects in a later generation. For example,
although urban population growth over the past century has occurred on less
than 3 percent of the earth’s land surface, that population accounts for 78
percent of carbon emissions, 60 percent of residential water use, and 76 percent
of industrial wood use.101 As the spatial and temporal differences between
cause and effect in urban growth widen, and effects of urban growth become
more and more distant in time and space, it is likely to be more and more
difficult for policy to regulate behavior. Indeed, at some point the spatial and
temporal distances may be so great as to obscure the source-and-effect
relationship entirely from policy eyes or at least make impracticable any hope
of proving causation at relevant scales and with sufficient reliability for
formulating policy.102
Discontinuity effects are particularly complex when temporal and spatial
properties exhibit causal nonlinearity, which may happen when the impacts of
aggregation or the benefits of policy investment are not felt until a significant
threshold is crossed. For example, the reduction in storm surge protection from
cumulative losses of coastal wetlands may be nonlinear and thus not detected or
anticipated early in the history of such losses.103 We may not recognize such a
problem until after a disaster such as Hurricane Katrina occurs, at which point
it has become dauntingly expensive to solve. Conversely, we may not know
that a particular policy response will be successful unless we first spend
mightily for a period with no measurable result.
Consider a spaghetti bowl scenario where many strands contribute to the
cumulative effects problem characterized by nonlinear aggregation. The
differences in the strands’ nonlinear attributes can greatly complicate the
process of effectively and fairly allocating their respective regulatory burdens
and costs. The regulated targets of one strand, for example, may complain
about having to share in the costs if no benefits within relevant policy time
frames can be demonstrated. But if the benefit yield is nonlinear and not

101. See Nancy B. Grimm et al., Global Change and the Ecology of Cities, 319 Sci. 756,
756 (2008).
102. For a thorough discussion of this effect in the context of climate change, see Biber,
supra note 60.
103. See Edward B. Barbier et al., Coastal Ecosystem-Based Management with Nonlinear
Ecological Functions and Values, 319 Sci. 321 (2008) (examining the policy difficulties flowing
from such nonlinearities).
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realized until after heavy investment, imposing those costs may be crucial to
achieving overall long-term traction on the cumulative effects problem. The
likely political pushback from that and similar strands may induce
policymakers to search for the most obvious strand, where short-term marginal
returns are high due to nonlinearity at the beginning of the cost curve.
However, as those low-hanging fruit opportunities are exhausted, it will
become all too clear that there remains a set of sources that have been ignored
and thus especially difficult to tackle.
The climate change effects observed today, for example, are caused by
emissions from decades ago; the harm-causing activities “have become ingrained politically, socially, and economically, precisely because it took a long
time frame for society to recognize the problems associated with those
activities.”104 These activities have thus become entrenched and resistant to
mitigating regulation. Moreover, even if a regulatory framework can be
installed notwithstanding the entrenchment effect, the framework will be
difficult to maintain “because the delayed nature of the harm virtually
guarantees that there will be a time period after regulation is imposed when the
harm will continue to occur—potentially leading to a ‘backlash’ against
apparently ineffective regulation.”105
Gulf hypoxia is a prototypical discontinuity problem. The National
Research Council warned in its recent report on Gulf hypoxia, for example, that
“it will require years, if not decades, to see downstream responses to nutrient
control actions.”106 The sources and causes of Gulf hypoxia are well
understood,107 but the problematic multiscalar spatial and temporal
discontinuities create a policy morass. First, many agricultural sources spread
throughout the vast Mississippi River watershed, applying fertilizers and
manure to croplands. Next, runoff carries fertilizer and manure nutrients from
the land, building up in the nested watershed structure. Then, spring flooding
sends a pulse of nutrients down the system and into the Gulf in one big shot far
from the sources. Finally, the hypoxic event—the result of the bloom, death,
and decomposition of algae feeding on the abundant nutrients—happens well
after and far from where the fertilizer and manure was applied.108 The story
sounds simple, but the scale of the aggregation and its spatial and temporal

104. Biber, supra note 60, at 6.
105. Id.
106. Committee on the Mississippi River and the Clean Water Act, Nat’l
Research Council, Nutrient Control Actions for Improving Water Quality in the
Mississippi River Basin and Northern Gulf of Mexico 49 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 NRC
Report].
107. See id. at 47 (“The major nutrient sources and their approximate, relative importance
are well known.”); id. at 48 (“There is scientific consensus that nitrogen is causing the northern
Gulf hypoxic zone in the largest areas and for the longest period.”).
108. Hypoxia generally occurs once per year, in the summer season. See Diaz &
Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 926.
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discontinuities have made hypoxia in estuarine systems a massive problem
around the globe.109 In the case of Gulf hypoxia, strong and conflicting regional
and industry interests are likely to divide states and complicate internal federal
policy formulation.110 What must happen is straightforward: the “enormous
amounts of nutrients entering the water body via the Mississippi River must be
reduced.”111 Yet “[a]chieving this goal will require an array of actions and
strategies across a broad swath of America’s heartland,” far from where the
harms of hypoxia occur.112 One prescription is to restore much of the
Midwest’s wetlands, but that will confront “the need for funding and an
unwillingness on the part of farmers to withdraw land from production.”113 In
this policy environment, it is hardly surprising that a federal and state task force
described the goal of significantly reducing Gulf hypoxia by 2015 as difficult to
meet and aspirational at best.114 Discontinuity problems like climate change
and Gulf hypoxia thus become massive in scale because it is difficult to draw a
relationship between the problem and the solution, a factor that often makes it
difficult to justify the high political and economic costs.
E. Policy Jungles—Complex Aggregation Problems
The typology thus far has described the simple aggregation problem type
and three variations, each involving a complicating spin: spaghetti bowls,
feedback, and discontinuities. Now we come to the policy jungles—cumulative
effects problems that experience all of these types together. For example,
feedback between two different strands contributing to a particular cumulative
effect can be nonlinear, spatially discontinuous, and temporally discontinuous.
Among dozens of strands there can be multiple sets of feedback loops
crisscrossing and transcending scales. As C.S. Holling and Carl Folke have
explained, climate change, ecological degradation, and problems of similar
quality are

109. See id. passim (discussing 400 hypoxic estuarine systems).
110. In this sense Gulf hypoxia is just one of many examples of the policy fragmentation
resulting from the discontinuities between land-based sources and marine-based effects and the
political struggles that follow. See Craig, supra note 42, at 831 (arguing that marine ecosystems
have long been ignored by the regulatory fragmentation with respect to water). Going back to
Eagle’s agency diversity model for oceans management, see supra text accompanying notes 86–
92, this may be yet another complicating factor for his proposal, as some dominant-use agencies
would not have control over distant but substantial sources affecting their respective priority-use
zones, though that puts them in no worse position than the multiple-use agencies he advises
against expanding.
111. Landers, supra note 17, at 54.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 63.
114. See Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force, Gulf
Hypoxia Action Plan 2008, at 9 (2008) [hereinafter Action Plan], available at
http://www.epa.gov/msbasin/pdf/ghap2008_update082608.pdf. The task force action plan is
discussed in more detail infra Part V.
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systems problems, where aspects of behaviour are complex and
unpredictable and where causes, while at times simple (when finally
understood), are always multiple. They are nonlinear in nature, crossscale in time and in space, and have an evolutionary character. This is
true for both natural and social systems. In fact, they are one system,
with critical feedbacks across temporal and spatial scales.115
They are, in short, the kind of phenomena modeled in complex adaptive
systems theory—the study of systems characterized by a macroscopic,
heterogeneous set of autonomous agents interacting and adapting in response to
one another and to external environment inputs.116
Cities and their sprawl are “the example par excellence of complex
systems: emergent, far from equilibrium, requiring enormous energies to
maintain themselves, displaying patterns of inequality spawned through
agglomeration and intense competition for space, and saturated flow systems
that use capacity in what appear to be barely sustainable but paradoxically
resilient networks.”117 As research from economics,118 ecology,119 sociology,120
and other disciplines makes clear, it is simply not possible to unravel the
tangled strands of such complex adaptive systems, trace the feedback loops,
nonlinearities, and discontinuities, and snip with surgical precision the
undesirable causal chains.121 Such a system’s internal mechanisms and
emergent properties defeat attempts to regulate it. Furthermore, small
misjudgments about the system’s dynamics have the potential to produce
wildly inaccurate predictions of the system’s trajectory over time.122 Accurate
115. C.S. Holling et al., Science, Sustainability, and Resource Management, in Linking
Social and Ecological Ecosystems 342, 352 (Filkret Berkes & Carl Folke eds., 1998).
116. There is no universally applied definition for complex adaptive systems. A
comprehensive overview is provided in John H. Miller & Scott E. Page, Complex Adaptive
Systems: An Introduction to Computational Models of Social Life (2007). For
applications in environmental law settings, see Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly:
Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 145 (2003); J.B. Ruhl,
Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean up the
Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 Hous. L. Rev. 933 (1997).
117. Michael Batty, The Size, Scale, and Shape of Cities, 319 Sci. 769, 769 (2008). See
also Michael Batty, Cities and Complexity: Understanding Cities with Cellular
Automata, Agent-Based Models, and Fractals 1–8 (2007).
118. See Eric D. Beinhocker, The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and
the Radical Remaking of Economics (2006); Robert M. May et al., Ecology for Bankers, 451
Nature 893 (2008).
119. See Simon Levin, Fragile Dominion: Complexity and the Commons (1999).
120. See R. Keith Sawyer, Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems (2005).
121. This is because “complexity arises when the dependencies among the elements
become important. In such a system, removing one such element destroys system behavior to an
extent that goes well beyond what is embodied by the particular element that is removed.” Miller
& Page, supra note 116, at 9. Thus “work is needed on distinguishing the complex . . . from the
just complicated in the presence of many possible explanatory models and imperfect data.”
Nicholas W. Watkins & Mervyn P. Freeman, Natural Complexity, 320 Sci. 323, 324 (2008).
122. See generally Ruhl, supra note 116, at 943–53 (discussing this insensitivity property
of complex systems, under which small changes in the system properties can lead to vastly
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cost-benefit analysis in such an environment is difficult to achieve. As
Bruegmann observes about sprawl, which he characterizes as “infinitely
complex,”123 it is
difficult to draw up such a [cost-benefit] balance sheet. Information
available at the time of any assessment is usually out of date by the
time it is fully collected and analyzed. Conclusions are almost
invariably based on the evidence of an insufficiently long time span
and on too few variables.124
Similarly, as climate change research increasingly points to nonlinear
positive and negative feedback loops operating at multiple spatial and temporal
scales,125 it becomes excruciatingly difficult to construct accurate models of
global climate and ecological trends over long time periods.126 Indeed, as we
learn more about the climate’s highly coupled processes, we will likely realize
with even greater clarity the difficulty of predicting its long-term behavior. As
a recent commentary in the journal Science explained, “The envelope of
uncertainty in climate projections has not narrowed appreciably over the past
30 years, despite tremendous increases in computing power, in observations,
and in the number of scientists studying the problem.”127 In other words,
greater knowledge about the climate system does not necessarily mean greater
predictive specificity about global climate patterns. In such a policy
environment, techniques such as risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis
become alarmingly fragile and dependent upon highly speculative assumptions
about the future.128
different trajectories, making prediction over the long term difficult).
123. Bruegmann, supra note 3, at 18. As he elaborates, “Trying to understand the
reciprocal relationships among city, suburbs, and exurbs is like trying to focus the eye
simultaneously on numerous objects ricocheting wildly around a confined space.” Id.
124. Id. at 222.
125. These and other findings are discussed in IPCC Summary, supra note 58, at 10–17.
126. See Douglas Fox, Back to the No-Analog Future, 316 Sci. 823 (2007). At the global
level, one significant limitation for modeling projection accuracy is the obvious fact that we have
no experience with a global climate operating at temperatures like those predicted. In short,
“[o]nce the world has warmed by 4°C, conditions will be so different from anything we can
observe today (and still more different from the last ice age) that it is inherently hard to say when
the warming will stop.” Myles R. Allen & David J. Frame, Call Off the Quest, 318 Sci. 582, 582
(2007).
127. Gerard H. Roe & Marcie B. Baker, Why Is Climate Sensitivity So Unpredictable?, 318
Sci. 629, 629 (2007). The emerging assessment is that things will not get better in this respect:
“[I]t is evident that the climate system is operating in a regime in which small uncertainties in
feedbacks are highly amplified in the resulting climate sensitivity. We are constrained by the
inevitable: the more likely a large warming is for a given forcing (i.e., the greater the positive
feedbacks), the greater the uncertainty will be in the magnitude of that warming.” Id. at 632. But
see M.D. Meyers et al., USGS Goals for the Coming Decade, 318 Sci. 200, 200 (2007)
(expressing optimism that the agency can “increase its capability to provide output from predictive
and empirical models for managers to test adaptive strategies, to reduce risk, and to increase the
potential for hydrological and ecological systems to be self-sustaining, resilient, or adaptable to
climate change and related disturbances.”).
128. See Farber, supra note 116, at 156–72. Estimates of the economic impact of climate
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Regulating a small piece of any such problem, as the Supreme Court
charged the EPA to do with automobile emissions in Massachusetts v. EPA,
thus opens up daunting complications. It is easy to command the EPA to
whittle away, but far less easy to tell the agency how and what the
consequences will be. For example, numerous other federal agencies warned
the EPA that its decision to regulate automobile greenhouse gas emissions
could reverberate with unintended consequences throughout the economy and
possibly hamper other agencies’ efforts to stem emissions.129 Perhaps not
wishing to be the target of such criticism, the Fish and Wildlife Service, which
added the polar bear to the list of endangered species in early 2008, proposed
rules specifically to limit the regulatory effect of the ESA over greenhouse gas
emission sources.130
Indeed, no federal agency has yet seemed eager to dive into regulating its
small corner of greenhouse gas emissions. One reason is undoubtedly that the
agencies understand that neither individually nor together can they reliably
predict the costs and benefits of possible policy responses, much less solve the
problem of climate change. Ironically, the one thing they can accurately assess
is the political heat they will likely take. Even when agencies are eager to
wrestle such massive problems, as many state and local governments have tried
with sprawl, success often seems ephemeral at best and comes with undesirable
tradeoffs, such as the inherent tension between growth limits and affordable
housing.131
We are not advocating despair, but rather a more realistic and reasoned
approach to cumulative effects problems. Some cumulative effects problems
are relatively simple in structure, while others are more complex. Some
problems owe their complexity to a single, dominant trait, such as strong
feedback between two causal strands or a sharp spatial discontinuity between
sources and effects. A few problems, such as climate change and sprawl, seem
to be impenetrable jungles of complications. The nature of the problem and in
particular how cumulative effects accumulate, says a great deal about how the
problem will respond to policy interventions. To be sure, we are not the first to
recognize cumulative effects as a target for law and regulation, but as the next
change, the cost of investment in technology and deployment needed to cut greenhouse gas
emissions, and the effect of either on gross economic productivity are all over the board. See
International Energy Association, Energy Technology Perspectives—Scenarios and
Strategies for 2050 (2008); Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change, 98 Am. Econ.
Rev. 1 (2008).
129. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
44,354, 44,356–96 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I).
130. See 73 Fed. Reg. 47,868 (Aug. 15, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt 402).
131. See Charles E. Connerly, Affordable Housing in Florida: Why Haven’t Florida’s
Growth Management Laws Met the Challenge of Adequately Housing All Its Citizens?, in
Growth Management in Florida: Planning for Paradise 261 (Timothy S. Chapin et al.,
eds., Ashgate 2008); Arthur C. Nelson et al., A Guide to Impact Fees and Housing
Affordability 3–5 (2008).
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Part shows, the law has so far responded with only rudimentary design
principles that fail to differentiate between types of massive problems.
III
CUMULATIVE EFFECTS AND THE LAW
In order for agencies to whittle away at massive problems, the law must
begin to address the cumulative effects that make these problems so massive in
scope and complexity. To be sure, judges, legislators, and agency officials have
long recognized the special challenge of using the law to address cumulative
effects. The overall impact of many separate actions may require regulation
even if any single act taken individually seems innocuous. For example, a court
in the early 1900s sustained a federal antitrust conspiracy indictment over the
objection that none of the individual acts involved had a direct effect on
interstate commerce, observing that “the law looks not at any particular act, but
at the aggregate effect of all the acts. The whole series of transactions is to be
judged by its fruit, and not by the legal significance of any one occurrence.”132
Likewise, concern about cumulative effects has had a particularly long
history in connection with judicial interpretation of federal power over
interstate commerce. Many cases involving the “negative” (or “dormant”)
Commerce Clause doctrine, which restricts states from interfering with
interstate commerce, evaluate the cumulative effects of state and local
regulations and taxes.133 More famously, starting in the New Deal era, the
Supreme Court devised the “aggregate effects” doctrine to sustain a
substantially broadened federal regulatory agenda.134 This doctrine, more
recently referred to as the “cumulative impacts” doctrine135 and the “cumulative
effects” doctrine,136 holds that “a single activity that itself has no discernible
effect on interstate commerce may still be regulated [federally] if the aggregate
effect of that class of activity has a substantial impact on interstate
commerce.”137

132. United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823, 833–34 (C.C.N.Y. 1906).
133. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 284 n.16 (1987).
Justice Jackson once warned that “[our] danger, as the forefathers well knew, is from the
aggregate strangling effect of a multiplicity of individually petty and diverse and local
regulations.” Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 401 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
134. The doctrine’s origin is Justice Black’s famous observation that the federal civil rights
legislation could reach isolated, purely intrastate acts of discrimination because of the “aggregate
effect of a great number of such acts of discrimination.” Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 276 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
135. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
191 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1999).
136. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
137. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S.
159, 166 (2001) (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 191 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1999)).
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The concept of cumulative effects has since reached more expansively
across the law,138 a result, one could reasonably conclude, of the broadened
federal interstate commerce power that the “aggregate effects” doctrine
enabled. Many of the applications suggest, as did the “aggregate effects”
doctrine, a judicial appreciation that the cumulative effects of many actions can
be substantial and therefore warrant federal regulation. The vast majority of
judicial references to cumulative effects occurred in cases decided after
1960,139 a strong indication that the burgeoning of federal regulation over
social, economic, and environmental realms has catalyzed attention to
cumulative effects problems. As a consequence, the concept of federal
regulation has spread to many fields. For example, agency regulations employ
the cumulative effects concept in fields as varied as banking law,140 securities
law,141 and disability law.142 Hundreds of judicial opinions examining the
concept of cumulative effects concern agency regulations promulgated under
three environmental laws:143 the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”),144 the ESA,145 and Section 404.146 Employment discrimination
cases also abound with references to cumulative effects as being important to
deciding the impact of employment practices and employer statements.147 In
reviewing these and other legal approaches to cumulative effects problems,
however, three basic strategies have been employed, each with significant
limitations: the “things add up” strategy, the predecision strategy, and the
adaptive management strategy.

138. Although the concept, whether called cumulative effects, aggregate effects,
cumulative impacts, or some other variant, is rarely mentioned in codified federal statutes, it
appears more frequently in federal agency regulations. Based on Westlaw searches in the CFR,
SCT, and ALLFEDS libraries, the terms are mentioned in over 100 Supreme Court opinions and
over 8700 federal lower court opinions. Many of these references are to trivial matters, such as to
the cumulative effect phrases in a jury instruction may have on the jury. See, e.g., Victor v.
Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 36 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). For further exploration of the use of
cumulative impacts in legal contexts, see Joseph H. Guth, Cumulative Impacts: Death-Knell for
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Decisions, 11 Barry L. Rev. 23 (2008).
139. Only 556 of the 8842 documents returned in the ALLFEDS library search predated
1960, and only 576 predated 1970.
140. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 620.11 (2005) (addressing the cumulative effect of changes in
accounting principles).
141. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.302 (2008) (addressing the cumulative effect of changes in
accounting principles).
142. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 220.14 (2002) (recognizing that multiple impairments can have
a cumulative effect).
143. Over 800 cases returned in the ALLFEDS library search involved one or more of
these three environmental laws.
144. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2000).
145. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006).
146. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).
147. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002) (explaining
that hostile workplace environment claims “are different in kind from discrete acts” because they
“are based on the cumulative effect of individual acts”).
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A. The “Things Add Up” Strategy
Courts, agencies and legislatures have primarily taken what we refer to as
the “things add up” strategy to cumulative effects problems, treating them as
simple aggregation problems. The core assumption underlying this strategy is
that there exists a linear, proportional aggregation from source to effects. For
example, in Wickard v. Filburn,148 the case that opened the cumulative effects
door to interstate commerce power jurisprudence, the Court found that although
farmer Wickard’s personal consumption of wheat would have a trivial effect on
the interstate market, “his contribution, taken together with that of many others
similarly situated, is far from trivial,” and therefore would, indeed, interfere
with the market.149
This rudimentary model of cumulative effects poses two shortcomings.
The first is breadth. The “aggregate effects” doctrine can be easily applied to a
wide variety of circumstances. After all, almost all things in modern, developed
economies do add up one way or another.150 As federal regulation after
regulation was bootstrapped on superficial “things add up” arguments, respect
for this theory dwindled. And appropriately so—if every activity contributes to
interstate commerce, then the Commerce Clause loses all meaning. The
backlash to this doctrinal emptiness has been palpable, with the Court’s
reformed jurisprudence, forged in United States v. Lopez, leading the way.151
The second shortcoming, as explained below in Part III.B, is that many
cumulative effects problems do not add up simply.

148. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
149. Id. at 128.
150. For example, a judge in one case found that the Endangered Species Act could extend
federal regulation to land development affecting the habitat of a protected fly, notwithstanding the
fact that the fly was found only in a small area of California and had never been the subject of
interstate commerce, because the species contributed to the aggregate of the Earth’s biodiversity
and that biodiversity in general substantially affects interstate commerce. Nat’l Home Builders
Ass’n v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052–54 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Several commentators have argued
that this application of the “aggregate effects” doctrine, which essentially makes every living
organism a part of interstate commerce, goes well beyond the principles of Wickard v. Filburn and
the Court’s other New Deal cases forging the doctrine. See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, The
Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 174, 199–204
(1998) (arguing that this logic would allow federal regulation of any human activity).
151. See 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the Court accepted the validity of the “aggregate
effects” doctrine but attached to it the requirement that the regulation must address economic
activities which, “viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect[] interstate commerce.” Id. at 561.
In a subsequent holding, the Court rejected “the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on
interstate commerce.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). However, in 2005 the
Court appeared to restore some vitality to the doctrine in approving federal criminal prosecution
of home-consumed marijuana. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). The evolution of the
“aggregate effects” doctrine is meticulously traced in Jim Chen, The Story of Wickard v. Filburn:
Agriculture, Aggregation, and Commerce, in Constitutional Law Stories 69–118 (Michael C.
Dorf, ed., 2d ed., 2008), and Bradford Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich: Is the Endangered Species
Act Constitutional under the Commerce Clause?, 78 U. Colo. L. Rev. 375 (2007).
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B. The Predecision Assessment Strategy
The predecision assessment strategy is far more sophisticated. It involves
directly incorporating the concept of cumulative effects into an agency’s
decisionmaking architecture. Before making a particular decision, the agency
must predict the future cumulative effects of some identified set of actions and
integrate these effects into the decision in some prescribed manner.
Accordingly, such an approach would recognize the attributes that prevent
sources from simply adding up, and integrate this more sophisticated
understanding into the formulae for decisions. However, although this approach
accommodates a more realistic conception of cumulative effects than the
simple “things add up” model, it is difficult to predict cumulative effects when
they are not linear and proportional over time and space. Therefore, there are
significant shortcomings here as well.
For example, environmental laws contain the most advanced versions of
the predecision assessment strategy. As mentioned above, an extensive body of
the law of cumulative effects has been developed under three environmental
statutes: NEPA, ESA, and Section 404. Of these, only Section 404 mentions
cumulative effects in the statutory text. However, all three programs have seen
extensive agency development of the concept through regulations and policies.
All three, moreover, adhere closely to the predecisional strategy for cumulative
effects. For instance, regulations promulgated under the ESA provide for
consultations between the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) and other federal
agencies about the effects of their actions on protected species. These
regulations require the FWS to “evaluate the effects of the action and
cumulative effects” and decide “whether the action, taken together with
cumulative effects, is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed
species.”152 Section 404 similarly requires the Corps to predict future
cumulative effects and to integrate that prediction into its decision whether or
not to permit wetlands development.153
This approach puts the Corps and the FWS in a precarious position
because the standards do not say how they should take cumulative effects into
perspective. The agencies could adopt the simple “things add up” model and in
doing so risk missing the mark widely where the cumulative effects do not
follow linear, proportional aggregation. Or, the agencies could attempt to
152. 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.14(g)(3)–(4) (2008). The agency defines cumulative effects as
“those effects of future State or private activities, not involving Federal activities, that are
reasonably certain to occur within the action area.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2008).
153. Statutory policies allow the Corps to issue general permits for disposal of fill material
in navigable waters covering classes of activities the agency determines “are similar in nature, will
cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will have only
minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (2006). Corps
regulations for project-specific fill permits require the agency to conduct “an evaluation of the
probable impacts, including cumulative impacts, of the proposed activity.” 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1)
(2002). See supra note 152 for the agency’s definition of “cumulative effects.”
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devise complex models of cumulative effects, which often would merely reveal
the utter uncertainty of how the effects aggregate.
The predecision dilemma has risen to the top of the policy reform debate
regarding NEPA, the environmental statute that has produced the most
developed body of cumulative effects law. NEPA requires all federal agencies
to
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible
official on—(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action [and]
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented.154
The Council on Environmental Quality (“the CEQ”), responsible for
issuing regulations implementing NEPA’s mandated environmental impact
statement (“EIS”) procedure for federal agencies, requires agencies to consider
the impacts of direct effects, indirect effects, and cumulative impacts.155
The CEQ’s conception of how to adjust for cumulative effects goes well
beyond the simple “things add up” approach. The agency’s 1997 guide on
considering cumulative effects explains that “determining the cumulative
environmental consequences of an action requires delineating the cause-andeffect relationships between the multiple actions and the resources, ecosystems,
and human communities of concern. Analysts must tease from the complex
networks of possible interactions those that substantially affect the
resources.”156 The guide advises analysts to “gather information about the
cause-and-effect relationships between stresses and resources” and to develop
“a conceptual model of cause and effect . . . . Networks and system diagrams
are the preferred methods of conceptualizing cause-and-effect relationships.”157
Applying these essential features of the NEPA assessment procedure to
massive cumulative effects problems like global climate change involves
relatively straightforward reasoning. Namely, if greenhouse gas emissions
154. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)–(ii) (2000). This provision also requires statements on
alternative actions, short- and long-term implications, and “any irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources.” Id. at § 4332(2)(C)(iii)–(v).
155. The CEQ has defined direct effects as effects “which are caused by the action and
occur at the same time and place,” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(a) (2008), indirect effects as effects “which
are caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still
reasonably foreseeable,” id. § 1508.8(b), and cumulative impacts as
the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action
when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless
of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions.
Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant
actions taking place over a period of time.
Id. § 1508.7.
156. Council on Environmental Quality, Considering Cumulative Effects
Under the National Environmental Policy Act vi (Jan. 1997).
157. Id. at 38.
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contribute to global climate change, then actions having the potential, directly
or indirectly, to cause greenhouse gas emissions could contribute to a direct,
indirect, or cumulative impact of climate change. Thus, the question of whether
those effects significantly affect the quality of the human environment arises,
therefore requiring an EIS. Indeed, in 1997 the CEQ issued draft guidance
stating that “the NEPA process provides an excellent mechanism for
consideration of ideas related to global climate change.”158 As the agency
explained:
Specifically, federal agencies must determine whether and to what
extent their actions affect greenhouse gases. Further, federal agencies
must consider whether the actions they take, e.g., the planning and
design of federal projects, may be affected by any changes in the
environment which might be caused by global climatic change. 159
The CEQ circulated its draft guidance; however, no administration has
shown any interest in adopting the suggested approach.160 NEPA, in other
words, anticipates an impact assessment process that is sufficiently flexible to
engage nonlinear problems such as climate change, but it has not been directed
toward this goal in practice. In fact, doing so has proven politically infeasible.
C. The Adaptive Management Strategy
A final approach, the adaptive management strategy, traces its origins to
C.S. Holling’s critique of predecisional approaches in his influential book from
the late 1970s, Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management.161
Holling and his colleagues found conventional environmental management
methods, particularly the environmental impact assessment process under
NEPA, at odds with the emerging model of ecosystems as complex, dynamic
systems. Under the dynamic model of ecosystems, they concluded,
management policy must put a premium on collecting information, establishing
158. Draft Memorandum from Kathleen A. McGinty, Chairman, Council on Envtl. Qual.,
to Heads of Fed. Agencies 1 (Oct. 8, 1997).
159. Id. at 4.
160. It is worth noting that some courts have gone in the direction suggested by the CEQ
draft policy. For example, the court in Border Power Plant Working Group v. Department of
Energy found that, in preparing an EIS in connection with the issuance of permits and rights-ofway allowing two utilities to build electricity transmission lines to connect power plants in
Mexico to the power grid in Southern California, the federal agencies had to consider the carbon
emissions from the Mexican power plants. 260 F. Supp. 2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 2003). In December
2009, the CEQ informed Senate members that it is considering issuing such guidance, concluding
there is “no basis” for excluding greenhouse gas emissions from NEPA assessments. See Letter
from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair, CEQ, to Honorable James M. Inhofe and Honorable John Barrasso
(Dec. 29, 2009), available at http://www.eenews.net/public/25/13847/features/documents/2010/
01/15/document_gw_02.pdf.
161. Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (Crawford S. Holling
ed., 1978). See also Kai N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Restoration under the Northwest Power Act:
Adaptive Management: Learning from the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16
Envtl. L. 431, 442 n.45 (1986) (tracing the term “adaptive management” to Holling’s book).
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measurements of success, monitoring outcomes, using new information to
adjust existing approaches, and possessing a willingness to change.162
Attempting to predict all the consequences of an action before deciding to go
forward and then never looking back, they argued, was at odds with the
adaptive management strategy.
Adaptive management is inherently a strategy for whittling away. It
rejects NEPA’s premise that the cumulative effects caused by and affecting an
action over time can be reliably predicted at the time the action is designed. Yet
effective adaptive management involves more than just passively waiting and
seeing; rather, it involves a more active “learning while doing.”163 Thus an
adaptive management plan must address how to handle new information and
contingencies; for example, it must have a robust working model of the causal
mechanisms of cumulative effects problems likely to occur.164 However, before
choosing which agencies should be given responsibility to adaptively whittle
away at a massive problem and how they should do so, it is necessary to
develop a more informed understanding of the nature of the massive problems
that the agencies are whittling away at. In the next Part, therefore, we explore
how our cumulative effects model can guide the design of agencies’ adaptive
management strategies.
IV
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR WHITTLING AWAY
In Part I, we explained why agency management of massive problems is
important, yet also difficult and poorly understood. We identified the
significant attributes of cumulative effects problems, showing that there are
very different types of massive problems, some more responsive to policy then
others. In Part II, we examined the behavior of massive problems, creating a
typology of problems from simple aggregation to policy jungles. In Part III, we
162. For background on the adaptive management model, see Holly Doremus, Adaptive
Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New Age”
Environmental Protection, 41 Washburn L.J. 50 (2001); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy and
Adaptive Change: Around the Loop and Back Again, 7 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 59 (2005); J.B.
Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 Minn. J.L. Sci & Tech 21 (2005).
163. Nat’l Research Council, Panel on Adaptive Management for Resource
Stewardship, Committee to Assess the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Methods of
Analysis and Peer Review for Water Resources Project Planning, Adaptive
Management for Water Resources Project Planning 22 (2004).
164. The National Research Council panel explains:
Adaptive management is not a “one size fits all” or a “cookbook” process, as
experience with the concept and its related procedures to date is limited and evolving.
There are multiple views and definitions regarding adaptive management, but elements
that have been identified in theory and in practice are: management objectives that are
regularly revisited and accordingly revised, a model(s) of the system being managed, a
range of management options, monitoring and evaluating outcomes of management
actions, mechanisms for incorporating learning into future decisions, and a
collaborative structure for stakeholder participation and learning.
Id. at 2. For a thorough description of adaptive management theory and protocol, see id. at 19–32.
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reviewed the limited strategies that the law has taken to manage massive
problems, and explained these strategies’ shortcomings. Here in Part IV, we
look forward, considering the most promising strategies for agencies to whittle
away at massive problems while at the same time gaining, as the Court
recommended in Massachusetts v. EPA, “a more-nuanced understanding of
how best to proceed.”165
We have suggested throughout this Article that agencies need to
understand the nature of a massive problem before determining how and where
to address the problem. The exercise would be unnecessary if all massive
problems were simple aggregations, with effects adding up in a straightforward
manner, allowing agencies to easily decide how hard to whittle based solely on
the size of the problem. But this is not the case for many policy problems, not
by a long shot. Rather, as problems become increasingly complex, each agency
responding to the problem must be increasingly aware of how its policy
measures will potentially help or hinder other agencies’ efforts or lead to yet
other undesirable effects. The following table reviews the specific concerns an
agency faces for different types of cumulative effects problems.
Table 5: Agency Concerns by Massive Problem Type
Problem Type
Simple
Aggregation
Spaghetti
Bowl

Feedback

Discontinuity

Policy Jungle

165.

Aggregation Properties
Things add up
proportionally in all
dimensions
Different sources
respond to different and
potentially offsetting
incentives
Different sources, causal
mechanisms, or effects
interact with one another
Large, often nonlinear
spatial or temporal gaps
between sources and
impacts

All these attributes
mixed together

Agency Concerns
None—we’re the experts; we just
whittle away to solve the problem
Our policy measure aimed at one
strand may undermine policy
measures aimed at different strands
Our policy measure may set in motion
responses that complicate or offset our
or other agencies’ policy measures
Our policy measure may be based on
an incomplete grasp of the scale of the
problem; our policy measure may be
ineffective at managing the problem
due to our lack of control over
sources, causal mechanisms, or
unaddressed effects
We face all of the above problems and
have limited capacity to model the
effects of our policy measure over
space and time

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007).
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The core message is that agencies that treat all massive problems as if
they were simple aggregation phenomena will have only limited success,
potentially causing more problems than they solve. Instead, it is helpful to
recognize how different problem properties can lead to different policy pitfalls.
With this basic point in mind, we return to the question that opened the
Article—what should the head of an agency do when faced with the task of
whittling away at a massive problem?
A. The Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis and Matching Principle Theories
If you asked a room full of administrative law scholars to identify the
most influential strategies for addressing policy problems, both massive and
minor, odds are that the short list would include cost-benefit analysis and the
matching principle. Cost-benefit analysis is the straightforward concept that the
costs and benefits of each policy alternative should be assessed and compared
with the absolute and relative costs and benefits of the other alternatives.166
Some might argue that the analysis should address distributional effects and
relative risk more prominently, but the fundamental idea remains that agencies
should take actions that maximize social benefits and minimize social costs.167
The other common strategy, the matching principle, is the similarly
straightforward idea that the scale of governance should be matched to the scale
of externalities associated with the policy issue.168 Local problems are best
managed by local authorities, global problems by global authorities.
Using these two principles as a starting point, one might assume that
agencies should base their whittling strategies on these two rules: (1) determine
the scope of authority based on the matching principle, and (2) determine the
policy instrument using cost-benefit analysis. However, while this presumption
makes sense for some policy problems, unfortunately, it is not applicable to
many others.
To be sure, the driving premise of the matching principle—that the
appropriate level of government is the one closest in scale to the externality to
be regulated—dissolves in the context of all but the simplest cumulative effects
problems. Externalities in complex aggregation problems have no fixed scale;
they are multiscalar, with positive and negative feedback across scales that
evolve over time. For example, the sources of greenhouse gases are varied in
nature and unevenly distributed around the planet, whereas the greenhouse
gases themselves are evenly distributed around the planet, but have different
effects locally.169 Similarly, the sources of sprawl are not necessarily confined
to the city experiencing the sprawl; decisions made in nearby or even distant
166. See Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 39, at 446–48.
167. See id.
168. See supra text accompanying note 30.
169. For a comprehensive analysis of the multiscalar attributes of climate change and the
corresponding need for multiscalar policy responses, see Osofsky, supra note 34.
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cities, or by entirely different scales of government, may influence how sprawl
emerges and behaves at any discrete location.170 Perhaps the most confounding
example is Gulf hypoxia. Given that there is no governance unit precisely
matching the scale of the Mississippi Valley watershed basin, is the federal
government more appropriate than the basin’s state governments? Would either
be more effective at regulating the activity of individual farms than the local
governments?
The solution cannot simply be to disaggregate externalities into multiple
scales and match them with multiple governance units. For example, sprawl’s
traffic jam externality might match with local governments, its air pollution
externality might match with state governments, its endangered species habitat
externality with the federal government, and so on. But even if the smartest
policy minds thought for a moment they had meta-matched all the externalities
of a cumulative effects problem to the array of government levels perfectly,
with neat lines of authority drawn to demarcate exclusive scopes of jurisdiction,
as soon as the governments began whittling away at their respective externality
domains the system of interrelated externalities would change. The once
efficient lines of authority would begin to lose their “matches.” The scales of
externalities in cumulative effects problems are not static; thus neither can be
the configuration of governmental responses. Ultimately, the matching
principle, no matter how meticulously applied, is no match for an evolving
cumulative effects problem.
Matching the scale of problem with the appropriate scale of authority
seems simple, especially compared to the challenge of conducting a meaningful
cost-benefit analysis in the face of complex cumulative effects problems. Once
one moves beyond simple aggregation problems, difficulties of feedback,
nonlinearity, and other attributes reduce cost-benefit analysis to estimation
exercises with enormous margins of error. In addition to the critiques that costbenefit analysis is subject to politicization, results have been distorted based on
choice of discount rate and other model assumptions, and bias in complex policy settings.171 For example, cost-benefit analyses of proposed policy responses
to climate change have produced widely varying and controversial results.172
The following table summarizes the obstacles that the matching principle
and cost-benefit analysis face when applied to cumulative effects problems. As
the table suggests, the more complex the problem, the less utility these
strategies hold.

170. See Buzbee, supra note 37, at 10 (“sprawl exceeds the reach of local governments”).
171. See Michael A. Livermore, Cause or Cure? Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory
Gridlock, 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 107, 114–19 (2008); Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 39, at
450–62.
172. See Daniel H. Cole, The Stern Review and Its Critics: Implications for the Theory and
Practice of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 48 Nat. Resources J. 53 (2008).
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Table 6: Utility of Common Strategies by Massive Problem Type
Problem Type
Simple
Aggregation

Matching Principle
Scale of externalities
may change

Spaghetti
Bowl

Scale of externalities
of each strand may
change; scale of
externalities of entire
bowl may change
Scale of any one
externality may be
disproportionate to
the scale of its
feedback network

Feedback

Discontinuity

Externalities distant
in time and space
from the sources
require transboundary
and intertemporal
matching

Policy Jungle

All scales may be
relevant and
interconnected;
different scales
dominate different
facets of the policy
problem

Cost-Benefit Analysis
Total costs and benefits will change
from the time of assessment (relative
costs and benefits and distribution
ratios, however, will remain the same)
Same as simple aggregation, but
applied to each strand; total bowl costbenefit assessment may mask distorted
cost-benefit ratios of particular strands
Absolute and relative costs and
benefits and their distribution ratios
will change from the time of
assessment; costs and benefits
associated with feedback affecting
policies outside the studied policy
problem may not be detected
Scale of the discontinuity (particularly
temporal), may make cost-benefit
assessment impractical; if analysis
conducted on one side of a nonlinear
threshold, assessment of absolute and
relative costs and benefits and their
distribution ratios may be wildly
wrong once the threshold is crossed
Absolute and relative costs and
benefits and their distribution
inherently evolve over time in
response to internal and external
conditions; changes, including
changes from alternative policy
measures, cannot be predicted;
defining the relevant sets of costs and
benefits associated with the policy
issue is difficult

B. Guidance from New Theories
Despite the limitations of cost-benefit analysis and the matching principle
when confronting massive problems, a dull blade is surely better than none at
all, particularly when an agency has no choice but to whittle. Hence, we do not
recommend rejecting these strategies outright. The question, then, is in addition
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to these strategies, where else can an agency look for a guide to whittling
away? There has been a great deal of recent scholarship on federalism,
instrument choice, and multiagency coordination that, taken together, sets out
promising alternative strategies.
1. Dynamic Federalism
Climate change, more than any other massive problem, has fueled
renewed interest in theories of federalism. At times, the burgeoning scholarship
seems a law review version of Goldilocks and the Three Bears, full of
competing arguments for the “just right” balance between federal, state, and
local authority.173 If our analysis of cumulative effects problems suggests
anything, however, it is that there is no one right balance. Therefore, we believe
that settling on the sole approach of centralized federal power versus devolved
state power, dual federalism, or cooperative federalism is unproductive.174 A
more nuanced approach is needed, similar to that embodied in what has become
known as the “Dynamic Federalism” theory.
Under Dynamic Federalism, “federal and state governments function as
alternative centers of power and any matter is presumptively within the
authority of both the federal and state governments.”175 The theory is not
radical—it does not suggest overhauling the basic federal-state-local structure
of governance. Rather, it explicitly calls for overlapping federal and state (and,
through states, local) jurisdictions.176 Scholars of Dynamic Federalism reject
173. See supra note 32.
174. Indeed, most people agree that all levels of government hold some level of
responsibility for responding to climate change. A 2008 survey of Virginians, for example, found
that “86 percent of respondents believe that the federal government is responsible on this issue. At
the same time, 85 percent of respondents also believe that state governments have some degree of
responsibility and 77 percent have a similar view of local governments.” Barry Rabe &
Christopher Borick, Miller Center of Pub. Aff., Univ. of Va., Report of the Virginia
Climate Change Survey 11 (2008), available at http://webstorage3.mcpa.virginia.edu/
panels/pdf/panel_ 2008_1021_borick.pdf.
175. Engel, supra note 22, at 176. As Kirsten Engel explains, “Alternatively named
‘empowerment federalism,’ ‘polyphonic federalism,’ ‘interactive federalism,’ ‘dynamic
federalism,’ and even ‘vertical regulatory competition,’ this reconceptualization has come in the
form of a cluster of theoretical proposals, all rejecting dual federalism and all emphasizing the
benefits of overlapping federal and state power.” Id. For additional scholarship developing
Dynamic Federalism and related principles, see Adelman & Engel, supra note 28; Robert B.
Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons from Coordination
(Emory Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 08-30, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1272967; Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic
Governance: The Changing Nature of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 Emory L.J. 1 (2007); Renee M.
Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 Conn.
Ins. L.J. 107 (2004); Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualist Federalism to Interactive Federalism, 56
Emory L.J. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Dualist Federalism]; Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of
Interactive Federalism, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 243 (2005) [hereinafter Interactive Federalism].
176. Sovacool, supra note 28, at 448. Of course, overlap of authority can occur under dual
federalism if federal and state authorities independently regulate the same problem, and under
cooperative federalism when the federal government employs (or more accurately, coerces) state

Ruhl.FINAL.doc (Do Not Delete)

104

3/19/2010 3:19 PM

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:59

the “minimal overlap” model in which there is a “particular allocation of at
least primary regulatory authority between the states and the federal
government,” replacing it with one “in which multiple levels of government
interact in the regulatory process.”177 As a result, Dynamic Federalism
“reject[s] the traditional static optimization model for an adaptive one.”178 As
Professors David Adelman and Kirsten Engle explain, in a Dynamic
Federalism strategy,
neither [the] federal nor [the] state governments limit themselves to
what many legal scholars have deemed to be their appropriate
domains. The federal government continues to regulate local issues,
such as remediation of contaminated industrial sites, which have few
direct interstate connections and few benefits from federal uniformity.
At the same time, state and local governments are not content to
confine their attention to issues of local concern, but are developing
policies on environmental issues of national or even international
scale, such as global climate change. Nor do environmental issues
“stay” in the control of any particular level of government, but rather
tend to pass back and forth between them like a proverbial football.179
Some Dynamic Federalism scholars identify the “interconnected”
attributes of environmental problems as reasons to employ Dynamic
Federalism,180 thus resonating with our cumulative effects model.181 But
proponents of Dynamic Federalism have primarily focused on models of
governance as the justification for this strategy,182 pointing to its advantages of

governments to implement federal standards. By contrast, overlap of authority under Dynamic
Federalism is neither accidental nor coerced. Adelman and Engel explain that cooperative
federalism
fares somewhat better with the dynamic school. The overlapping authority, although
asymmetric, at least has the trappings of a dynamic system. Cooperative federalism
nonetheless falls short from the point of view of the dynamic school. The federal laws
and regulations are often, but not always, so comprehensive as to exclude for all
practical purposes alternative approaches by the states.
Adelman & Engel, supra note 28, at 1812–13. Still, many commentators express faith in the
ability of traditional cooperative federalism governance to respond effectively to massive
problems such as climate change. See, e.g., Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies
and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Is Useful for Addressing Global
Warming, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 799 (2008).
177. Engel, supra note 22, at 161.
178. Adelman & Engel, supra note 28, at 1798.
179. Id. at 1796.
180. See, e.g., Sovacool, supra note 28, at 408.
181. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 28, at 1799–1800.
182. An important exception is the work of Adelman and Engel, who emphasize the
complexity and multiscalar attributes of environmental problems in developing and distinguishing
the variant of Dynamic Federalism they call Adaptive Federalism. See id. at 1814–18, 1827–28.
They focus their attention, however, less on developing and learning from a model of
environmental problems than on exploring differences they have with Dynamic Federalism
scholars over the status of states in the multijurisdictional overlap of authorities, with their
preference being for a strong but not overpowering federal role. See id. at 1830–40.
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plurality, dialogue, redundancy, accountability, and economies of scale.183 The
key point relating to massive problems is the theory’s overlapping, flexible
distribution of authority between federal, state, and local agencies. Namely,
while it may appear inefficient to have several agencies whittling away at the
same externality,184 the built-in redundancy of Dynamic Federalism can
provide significant benefits. It gives the overall system of governance more
space to track the evolving scales of externalities.185 It allows governance
adaptation to transpire more quickly and with less political jockeying than
static, exclusive jurisdiction models such as the matching principle, under
which neat divisions of authority would have to be constantly redrawn. Having
multiple agencies working within overlapping scales can also promote synergy
between the agencies.186 Finally, the ability to adjust which agencies are
involved allows greater flexibility to craft place-based coalitions of agencies
responsive to the shifting and discontinuous spatial and temporal scales of the
externalities—a flexibility that makes it possible to pass around the proverbial
football as a complex cumulative effects problem changes form over time.
What Dynamic Federalism scholarship does not address in any detail,
however, is which knives the whittlers should use; it lays out only who should
hold the knives. Climate change is also fueling debate in the environmental
policy arena about instrument choice, with prescriptive regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions squaring up against carbon taxes and market-based
cap-and-trade programs for policy dominance.187 Most multicriteria
assessments of instrument choice in environmental policy, however, conclude
that no particular instrument is superior to any other across the board.188
Moreover, consistent with the model of cumulative effects problems, studies
find that employing several instruments, or hybrids of them, may be necessary
to address multiple externalities associated with some environmental

183. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 28, at 1808; Schapiro, Interactive Federalism,
supra note 175, at 292–93; Sovacool, supra note 28, at 448–51.
184. See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative
Law, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 214 (2006).
185. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 28, at 1817–18.
186. See id. at 1809–10 (summarizing literature suggesting that overlapping authority can
promote initiative at one governance scale and spark other scales to follow promising policy
innovations).
187. See generally Abate, supra note 32 (exploring the role of litigation); Victor B. Flatt,
Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change Legislative Proposal Is
“Best”?, 102 Nw. U.L. Rev. Colloquy 123 (2007) (comparing cap-and-trade proposals); Lisa
Heinzerling, Climate Change and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.F. L. Rev. 111 (2007) (emphasizing
regulation); Symposium, Global Warming, 22 Nat. Resources & Env’t 1 (2008), at 3–55 (series
of articles exploring a wide range of instruments).
188. A recent comprehensive study by Goulder and Parry, for example, uses costeffectiveness, distributional equity, risk minimization, and political feasibility as evaluation
criteria for a broad array of incentive-based, regulatory and cost comparison policy tools,
concluding that no single instrument is clearly superior along all the criteria. See Lawrence H.
Goulder & Ian W.H. Parry, Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy 1 (Apr. 2008).
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problems.189 Employing multiple instruments may be necessary for other
complex cumulative effects problems, as well. These concerns are reflected in
emerging scholarship on New Governance theory, which, like Dynamic
Federalism in its rejection of static governance configurations, rejects “uniform
one-size-fits-all rules” associated with conventional prescriptive regulation.190
2. New Governance
The central organizing principles of New Governance theory are
stakeholder participation, collaboration among interests, diversity of and
competition between instruments, decentralization of governance structures,
integration of policy domains, flexibility, and an emphasis on noncoerciveness
and adaptation.191 Rigidly relying on fixed, uniform regulatory instruments,
such as technology standards and regulatory prescriptions, forecloses
adaptation to evolving, complex cumulative problems; indeed, if anything the
problems are more likely to adapt to and eventually work around the fixed
rules.192 Governance institutions will need a broader array of instruments,
ranging from “hard” prescriptive mandates to “soft” incentive- and
information-based tools, to test for leverage over the more tractable attributes
of cumulative effects problems over time. New Governance theory resonates
with that theme.
New Governance’s emphasis on instrument diversity and flexibility also
fits well with Dynamic Federalism’s emphasis on overlapping authorities
working in concert to address cumulative effects problems. Instrument diversity
in the hands of one agency, or in the hands of several agencies separated by
precise lines of authority, offers less than when in the hands of multiple
overlapping authorities. Overlapping authorities are more likely to discover
which instruments most effectively respond to particular externalities of a
cumulative effects problem. Overlapping authorities also may be more adept at
passing instruments around as the cumulative effects problem evolves and its
189. See id. at 3.
190. See Karkkainen, supra note 23, at 480. For a sweeping overview of New Governance
theory, one which Karkkainen reviews, see Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation
and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342 (2004)
[hereinafter The Renew Deal]. For additional scholarship developing New Governance principles,
see The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance (Lester M. Salamon ed.,
2001); Christie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities
Regulation, 45 Am. Bus. L.J. 1 (2008); Alana Klein, Judging as Nudging: New Governance
Approaches for the Enforcement of Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39 Colum. Hum.
Rts. L. Rev. 351 (2008); Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89
Minn. L. Rev. 498 (2004) [hereinafter Setting the Agenda]; Lester M. Salamon, The New
Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1611 (2001);
Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 434 (2007). The
thesis of New Governance theory is explored more fully infra in Part IV.B.
191. See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 190, at 371–404.
192. For a discussion of how complex, evolving policy problems can adapt around fixed
prescriptive rules, see Ruhl, supra note 116, at 967–91.
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externalities change in form, intensity, and scale.
Inherent in the feedback, nonlinearity, and discontinuities of complex
cumulative impacts problems, however, is the potential for any policy measure
to spin off its own unanticipated consequences, some good and some not.
Adopting Dynamic Federalism’s federalist structure and New Governance’s
instrument diversity does not make self-evident how to plan for and respond to
these unanticipated effects. Indeed, the potential for backfire may increase with
the number of agencies and instruments thrown at the problem, leading to “a
glorious mess.”193 Other federalism models make very clear who is in
command of what, whereas Dynamic Federalism introduces the ambiguity of
overlapping authority. Conventional prescriptive regulation uses a small set of
inflexible tools of policy, whereas New Governance, by embracing experimentation, collaboration, and diversity, may increase uncertainty. The advantages
of Dynamic Federalism and New Governance, however, would be undermined
if governance structures were locked into place and if instrument choices were
restricted and difficult to change. To be sure, a coordination method is needed,
but it cannot be one that undermines the project it is coordinating.
3. Transgovernmental Networks
Transgovernmental Network theory fits well within the coordination
demanded by Dynamic Federalism and New Governance.194 The theory was
forged initially in the context of international law, where nation states, while
still the most important actors, have increasingly disaggregated into component
institutions sharing roles with nonsovereign bodies.195 Transgovernmental
Network theory emphasizes the nonhierarchical horizontal and vertical
networks that are built among the officials of those national and international
institutions to exchange information, identify best practices, harmonize

193. In a different context, Congressman John Dingell threatened that failure to create a
federal cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases would lead to agency regulations and “a
glorious mess.” John Dingell, Op-Ed., “A Glorious Mess,” Wall St. J., Apr. 12, 2008, at A8.
194. The seminal and still most comprehensive discussion of Transgovernmental Network
theory is found in Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004). For additional
scholarship developing Transgovernmental Network principles, see Neil Craik & Joseph
DiMento, Environmental Cooperation in the (Partially) Disaggregated State: Lessons from the
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, 8 Chi. J. Int’l L. 479 (2008); Patrick X.
Delaney, Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across Borders, 47 Va. J. Int’l L. 413 (2007);
Eleanor D. Kinney, The Emerging Field of International Administrative Law: Its Content and
Potential, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 415 (2002); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l
L. 1 (2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 Ind. J.
Global Legal Stud. 347 (2001); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Transnational Networks and
International Criminal Justice, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 985 (2007); Christopher Whytock, A Rational
Design Theory of Transgovernmentalism: The Case of E.U.-U.S. Merger Review Cooperation, 23
B.U. Int’l L.J. 1 (2005).
195. See Slaughter, supra note 194, at 18, 22–23.
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approaches, and enforce the overall international policy program.196 The
movement toward Dynamic Federalism and New Governance at domestic
federal and state scales portends the same conditions that are giving rise to such
networks in international contexts.197
The interagency networks are not fixed, legally codified, or uniform. They
are established through practice, based on the needs of the agencies as they
address the policy problem. While they may be memorialized through planning
agreements, they depend as much or more on personal relationships and
reputations as on formal institutional relationships and legalistic channels of
communication.198 A scientist or policymaker in an agency might be a member
of many such semiautonomous networks addressing different problems, one
link in a set of “weak ties” that facilitate information flow across and between
social networks.199 As many people in many agencies build these ties, the
overlapping authorities structure becomes less a mangle and more an
organism.200 As a result, the networked agencies are better equipped to follow
the evolution of cumulative effects problems because people in the network, as
opposed to entire institutions, can more adeptly transfer information, confer
about trends, identify and raise alerts about unintended consequences of policy
measures, and so on.

196. See id. at 19–22.
197. See Freeman & Farber, supra note 38, at 899 (“It is intriguing to see the supposedly
hierarchical world of domestic regulation evolving in a direction reminiscent of modern
international relations.”).
198. See Levit, supra note 24, at 182.
199. Network theory is proving of increasing use and value in the social sciences. See
generally Stephen P. Borgatti et al., Network Analysis in the Social Sciences, 323 Sci. 892 (2009)
(reviewing advancements and applications of network theory in social sciences). Some social
network theorists have suggested that wide networks of small-scale “weak” interactions form
efficient large-scale patterns of information flow, whereas narrow networks of intense “strong”
ties can isolate interpersonal relations. Thus, as Mark Granovetter famously suggested, “weak ties,
often denounced as generative of alienation are . . . indispensable to individuals’ opportunities and
to their integration into communities; strong ties, breeding local cohesion, lead to overall
fragmentation.” Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 Am. J. Soc. 1360, 1378
(1973). Although the literature debating the merits of weak and strong ties is legion (Granovetter’s
article is cited over 7000 times), few social theorists contend that weak ties are not important. See
Daniel Z. Levin & Rob Cross, The Strength of Weak Ties You Can Trust: The Mediating Role of
Trust In Effective Knowledge Transfer, 50 Mgmt. Sci. 1477, 1478 (2004) (surveying the
literature). Digital records, faster computers, and more robust mathematical models have allowed
network theorists to study larger and more complex social networks, with many studies
confirming the important role of weak ties. See, e.g., John Bohannon, Tracking People’s
Electronic Footprints, 314 Sci. 914 (2006).
200. Or, as Nan Hunter puts it, “a circulatory system rather than a set of defined
partnerships.” Nan D. Hunter, “Public-Private” Health Law: Multiple Directions in Public
Health, 10 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 89, 103 (2007).
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V
WHITTLING AWAY IN ACTION
These proposed strategies for agencies to more efficiently whittle away
are all very theoretical. Massive problems, though, are all very real. Therefore,
this Article would be of limited use if agencies could not assess practical
examples of what we recommend. Accordingly, to ground our proposal in
practice, in Part V we examine a series of case studies that employ various
aspects of our recommendations, identifying both the successes and remaining
challenges.
A. Case Study in “Weak Ties” Agency Coordination Networks: The Gulf
Hypoxia Task Force
We start with the Gulf Hypoxia Action Plan (“the Action Plan”). The
Action Plan was formulated by the Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico
Watershed Nutrient Task Force (“the Gulf Hypoxia Task Force” or “the Task
Force”), a network of federal and state agencies that organized to devise a
coordinated strategy for responding to the Gulf hypoxia syndrome.201 The
Action Plan demonstrates the convergence of Dynamic Federalism, New
Governance, and Transgovernmental Networks theories in addressing a
massive cumulative effects problem, as well as the potential shortcomings of
such an approach.
The Task Force is an unusual creature in administrative law. Participant
agencies retain their independent autonomy and authority as defined by their
respective federal and state organic statutes, but they have stepped outside the
solo agency policy response mode by entering into a form of networked
resource pooling. On one hand, each agency ultimately answers to its
respective legislature, citizens, and courts, but on the other hand, each designs
its particular policy response with the objective of executing the multiscalar,
multiagency coordinated strategy. This flexible networked approach frees
participant agencies to determine how best to whittle away at Gulf hypoxia, but
201. See Action Plan, supra note 114. In the Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia
Research Control Act of 1998, Congress identified eleven federal agencies to participate in the
effort and charged them with providing for “Federal cooperation and coordination with and
assistance to the coastal States, Indian tribes, and local governments in the prevention, reduction,
management, mitigation, and control of hypoxia and its environmental impacts.” Coast Guard
Authorization Act of 1998 § 603(b)(2)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1451. The Task Force began as a federal
interagency working group coordinated through the White House Office of Science and
Technology Committee on Environment and Natural Resources. See U.S. Envtl. Protection
Agency, Mississippi River Basin Watershed Nutrient Task Force, http://www.epa.gov/
msbasin/taskforce.htm. Its first major work product was the 2001 Action Plan for Reducing,
Mitigating, and Controlling Hypoxia in the Northern Gulf of Mexico (2001), available
at http://www.epa.gov/msbasin/tfproducts.htm. The 2008 report is the Task Force’s effort to
“track progress, update the science, and adapt actions to improve the effectiveness of the efforts.”
See Action Plan, supra note 114, at 4. The work of the Task Force can be followed at its
website, http://www.epa.gov/msbasin/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
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as we shall see it also presents novel issues for administrative law.
The Action Plan recognizes that the causal mechanisms of Gulf hypoxia
involve interactions between nutrient flows, landscape changes, river
channelization for navigation and impoundments for water reservoirs, water
diversions from the system, and a multitude of natural and anthropogenic
sources of nitrogen and phosphorous nutrient loads.202 In other words, the
Action Plan is premised on a model of Gulf hypoxia as a complex, multiscalar,
massive cumulative effects problem dominated by dispersed sources and spatial
and temporal discontinuities.
Clearly, planning a comprehensive solution to Gulf hypoxia is beyond the
capacity of any one agency or group of agencies. As the 2008 National
Research Council (“NRC”) report on the problem acknowledges, “A
comprehensive plan involves scientific, water quality, social, political, and
economic considerations that will take years to understand better, and hence
any comprehensive plan will remain a work in progress for at least several
decades.”203 The NRC thus called on federal and state agencies to begin using
their existing range of regulatory tools to whittle away, urging that “[i]f
progress is to be seen within these water quality problems, initial actions must
be taken somewhere, at some time.” 204 The NRC further explained that these
“initial actions are part of an adaptive approach that is essential to addressing a
long-term, large-scale problem like water quality management across the
Mississippi River basin and into the northern Gulf of Mexico.”205
Wisely, given the complexity of Gulf hypoxia, the Task Force did not try
to match the problem with one mega-agency or to divide it into a patchwork
quilt of smaller, nonoverlapping matching solutions. Rather, the Task Force,
consisting of representatives from five federal agencies and ten state agencies
from states within the thirty-one-state watershed,206 recognized that
“[i]mplementation of the Action Plan will require a significant level of
commitment from the Federal agencies and State and local governments.”207
True to Dynamic Federalism, therefore, the Action Plan espouses the
continuing need for “[a] reassessment of the roles and responsibilities assigned
to Federal agencies, the States, Tribes, and the Sub-Basin Committees.”208
Eschewing matching principle rhetoric and formulations, each of the Task
Force’s eleven proposed “next steps” action items specifies a set of agencies
that will “take the lead” and another set that “will help.”209 The lists of lead and
helper agencies vary considerably in their mixes of constituent federal and state
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See Action Plan, supra note 114, at 22.
2008 NRC Report, supra note 106, at 49.
Id.
Id.
Action Plan, supra note 114, at 9, 60.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 30–58 (introducing and then describing each of the eleven action items).

Ruhl.FINAL.doc (Do Not Delete)

2010]

3/19/2010 3:19 PM

MASSIVE PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

111

agencies, with no single federal agency dominating and with federal agencies in
general sharing roles with the state agencies.210 Furthermore, the states are
organized into a basin-wide coalition and several sub-basin committees.211 The
resulting proposal is a mosaic of overlapping agency responsibilities with every
agency having a role in many of the identified next step agenda items and no
agency an island of authority over any externality or need of the project.
In terms of instrument choice, the Action Plan adopts the New
Governance model, recognizing that “no single approach to nutrient reduction
would be effective in every state.”212 Instead, the Action Plan advises using a
mix of instruments including incentives, technical assistance, planning,
research, education, land conservation, and voluntary and mandatory best
management practices.213 The Action Plan also emphasizes collaboration with
nutrient sources,214 including technological innovation to help reduce nutrient
emissions from farms and industrial facilities.215
As the Action Plan approach suggests, the convergence of Dynamic
Federalism and New Governance is about employing more whittlers and giving
them more knives. This directly contrasts the matching principle’s approach of
finding one whittler for each problem and the cost-benefit analysis approach of
finding just the right knife. This seems all for the good in theory, but it raises
the question of how it will work in practice. Namely, how will the agencies
coordinate how they go about whittling?
An immediate concern is how Dynamic Federalism and New Governance
strategies will avoid creating a Tower of Babel effect, with a mangled swarm of
well-meaning knives lunging in at all angles. Unfortunately, neither Dynamic
Federalism nor New Governance scholarship offers clear answers. Dynamic
Federalism scholars call for “a more modular conception of the agency, a
conception in which the agency is not a lone monolith, but is embedded in a
network of relationships with other agencies—relationships that must be
coordinated, managed, and steered.”216 Similarly, New Governance scholars
envision “network[s] of stakeholders working together to achieve outcomes,
management by negotiation, and dispersed networks rather than traditional
methods of command and control.”217 As a practical matter, however, it
advances the ball little to suggest that many agencies using many regulatory
knives should coordinate—that much seems obvious.
To address this coordination challenge the Action Plan incorporates the
“weak ties” approach of Transgovernmental Networks. For example, a major
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See id.
See id. at 17.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 18, 32–33, 37.
See id. at 5.
Id. at 24–25.
See Freeman & Farber, supra note 38, at 837.
Hunter, supra note 200, at 101.
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theme of the Action Plan is that “[t]he States and Federal agencies must
coordinate efforts across organizations and programs and use adaptive
management to modify the strategies as new information and innovative
solutions are acquired.”218 State sub-basin committees have “worked to
coordinate actions in the sub-basin states” and “have opened the discussion to
include many stakeholders not represented on the Task Force, including
additional basin states, state agencies, and interested parties and
organizations.”219 Next-step agenda items include “coordinat[ing],
consolidat[ing], and improv[ing] access to data collected by State and Federal
agencies”220 and “track[ing] interim progress on the actions to reduce nitrogen
and phosphorous by producing an annual report on federal and state program
nutrient reduction activities and results.”221
Following this lead, the NRC report on Gulf hypoxia proposed that the
EPA and the Department of Agriculture create an interagency research center
to “represent the nexus of federal interagency, federal-state, and interstate
cooperation.”222 The proposed center would “coordinate and facilitate”
management of a basinwide water quality monitoring, assessment, and nutrient
control program.223 The NRC urged that participation of other federal and state
agencies would “be vital to the center’s operations and functions.”224 Neither
the Action Plan nor the NRC’s vision of the research center suggests that
coordination would come by command coming from on high or would be left
to spontaneous bottom-up initiative. Instead they rely on a tangible, yet legally
informal, network with high expectations for coordination. Indeed, this seems
to be the inevitable coordination arrangement for any governance structure
depending on Dynamic Federalism’s overlapping authorities and New
Governance’s diversity of instruments.
B. Next Steps for Administrative Law: Endorsing New Forms
of Multiagency Coordination
Within a “weak ties” network such as the Gulf Hypoxia Task Force, how
does each agency know what to do? The Task Force, after all, is not a supraregulatory body with authority over its members. It is not even a free-standing
institution. Having agreed to participate in the multiagency efforts, once the
members of the Task Force go home to their respective agencies with copies of
the Action Plan in hand, what next? Agencies and local planning offices face
this precise question any time they are charged with whittling away at massive

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Action Plan, supra note 114, at 33.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 50.
2008 NRC Report, supra note 106, at 4.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 4.

Ruhl.FINAL.doc (Do Not Delete)

2010]

3/19/2010 3:19 PM

MASSIVE PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

113

problems and turn to interagency coordination as a strategy for developing
policy responses.
As with any system of agency decision making, the driver behind this set
of issues is the balance between agency autonomy and agency
accountability.225 The solo versus collaborative models of agency alternatives
discussed in Part I define a spectrum along which agencies guard autonomy and
retain accountability to varying degrees. Agencies can attempt to spread accountability through coordination with other agencies, but only at the expense
of autonomy. It would be quite a trick, in other words, if an agency could
spread accountability to other agencies while retaining complete decisionmaking autonomy. Administrative law is justifiably wary of such strategies.
1. Limits of the Solo Strategy
Administrative law is built primarily around the solo strategy, in which
each agency operates as an autonomous unit and is accountable as an
autonomous unit to its respective legislature, public, and courts. In that context,
an agency engages in interagency coordination largely to gain information,
allowing other agencies to provide input but preventing them from intruding on
agency autonomy or interfering with agency-specific accountability
mechanisms such as public participation and judicial review. NEPA, for
example, requires that any federal agency engaged in an environmental impact
assessment must consult with all other federal agencies that have “jurisdiction
by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact
involved.”226 However, the statute imposes no formal, substantive coordination
duties—everything about NEPA operates from the perspective of a specific
agency and the consequences of its decision.
This solo approach has obvious advantages in terms of autonomy and
accountability: (1) it requires each agency to take full responsibility for its decisions, (2) it aligns agency incentives according to specific legislative directives,
(3) it insulates agency autonomy from external agency encroachment, and (4) it
precisely delineates the scope of agency accountability. When massive
problems far exceed the scope and capacity of any agency, however, the solo
strategy is a recipe for failure. By keeping each agency insulated from others
with jurisdiction to address the problem and linking them only through
information exchange programs, the solo strategy puts blinders on each
agency’s capacity to “see” the cumulative effects behavior of the problem.
In the spaghetti bowl scenario, for example, each agency could be
assigned a particular strand that contributes to the cumulative effects. With the
focus permitted by the solo strategy, each agency could find itself in a strong
225. Professors Freeman and Farber, for example, identify agency autonomy and
accountability as significant issues for their conception of “modular” multiagency environmental
regulation. See Freeman & Farber, supra note 38, at 900–09.
226. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000).
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position to manage the causal mechanisms of its strand. But how would any
one agency see the entire bowl of effects or the effects from strands that are
assigned to other agencies? And if the problem is more complex than the
spaghetti bowl scenario, suffering from feedback and discontinuity problems,
how would any one agency detect feedback loops coursing through the system
of sources and causal mechanisms, nonlinear thresholds affecting different
causal properties, and temporal and spatial discontinuities reaching outside its
scope of vision? Most importantly, how would any one agency learn that its
policy measures were interfering with those of other agencies?
An extreme reaction to these concerns might join all agencies with some
jurisdiction over a massive problem into a formal coordinated entity. Each
agency would yield some of its autonomy to the coordinated entity, but each
would also shift some of its accountability to that entity. This is precisely how
the entity known as CalFed has operated, and precisely why its history has been
riddled with problems.227
2. Case Studies in Multiagency Coordination Failure
a. CalFed
CalFed is a formal multiagency coordination effort comprising twentyfive federal, state, and local agencies, each with some jurisdiction over the BayDelta watershed and estuary (the “Bay-Delta”) in northern California. The BayDelta is critically important both as a source of drinking and irrigation water
and as a home to hundreds of species. It also suffers from a host of resource
degradation problems.228 The challenges of the Bay-Delta are great. When solo
agency efforts failed to produce solutions, all eyes focused on bringing about a
coordinated approach.
CalFed was no ordinary multiagency coordination undertaking, however.
As Professor David Owen describes it, CalFed operated “[o]n a grand and
expansive scale,” employing “a set of complex strategies for allowing
increasing water consumption from an estuary where scarcity is common and
variability endemic.”229 Although legal scholarship has described CalFed’s
innovations as “models of creative pragmatism,” Owen concludes that those
innovations have not succeeded.230 In his comprehensive assessment of
CalFed’s accomplishments, he finds that “[d]espite many advantages—
regulatory creativity and cooperation, sometimes substantial funding, attention
from high-level officials, and an impressive confluence of government and

227. For background on CalFed and its rise and fall, see Freeman & Farber, supra note 38,
at 837–76; Owen, supra note 36, passim.
228. For a brief but compelling survey of the problems the area faces, see Robert F.
Service, Delta Blues, California Style, 317 Sci. 442 (2007).
229. Owen, supra note 36, at 1149.
230. Id.
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private expertise—the federal-state programs designed to redress the BayDelta’s resource conflicts have so far produced a fiasco.”231
What went wrong? Although many factors must be considered, Professors
Jody Freeman and Dan Farber home in on strong institutionalized coordination
and shifted agency accountability as key traits of CalFed, traits that underlie
many of the bumps in the difficult road that CalFed has traveled. They describe
CalFed as an “intensive collaboration”232 ensconced in federal and state law
and featuring
both formal and informal tracks of stakeholder participation (including
the Public Advisory Group and many informal opportunities for
contact with both the Authority members and agency staff); a rigorous
Science Program that independently reviews each aspect of program
implementation; Annual Work Plans requiring detailed updating by
agencies; . . . a package of commitments to renew balanced
implementation of the key elements of the plan; and an Authority
created to coordinate agency actions, which themselves remain subject
to . . . applicable administrative law requirements. In the face of such
overlapping and complementary features, it would be misleading to
suggest that this process of checks and balances is “unaccountable.” 233
With this dramatic transfer of autonomy and accountability necessary for
CalFed collaboration, however, came significant challenges. As Freeman and
Farber explain, efforts like CalFed suffer because agencies resist transferring
their autonomy to the collective entity and because legislatures and public
constituents are concerned about the diffusion of accountability.234 The
agencies jockey for power and money, and everyone else wants to know which
entity to blame if the effort fails.
In essence, CalFed has been an attempt to create a formal, institutionalized, strongly coordinated, multiagency entity, the scope of which, it was
hoped, would match that of the Bay-Delta resource issues. The program is a
testament to the allure of using the matching principle to design “one-fellswoop” responses to massive problems: if a single agency cannot be formed to
wrap around the problem, then fuse many agencies into a proxy for such a
behemoth. But it also demonstrates how difficult it is to fuse agencies
accustomed to autonomy and accountability into a strongly coordinated entity.
Even in the best of funding environments, which CalFed enjoyed, any such
effort is likely to become top-heavy with process and light on product. As
Owen concludes, the CalFed approach is too dependent on faith that “regulatory brilliance” will emerge from the strongly coordinated collective entity.235

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
Freeman & Farber, supra note 38, at 907.
Id. at 908–09.
See id. at 900–01, 906–07.
See Owen, supra note 36, at 1215.
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b. Chesapeake Bay Program
A similar story from the opposite coast can be told about the multistate
effort to control pollution in the Chesapeake Bay. Lauded at its inception in
1983 as a triumph of political will,236 and cited frequently in its early days as a
model of interagency coordination,237 the Chesapeake Bay Program (“the
Program”) has become a poster child for highly institutionalized and
bureaucratized coordination. In her probing study of the Program, Professor
Annecoos Wiersema cites insiders as observing that “any accurate
representation of the Program’s structure would have to have many dotted lines
running between various committees and subcommittees.”238
Indeed, the “Program is renowned for being complex in the sense that the
relationship among the committees and subcommittees is not always a
straightforward hierarchy.”239 The Program, in other words, has supplanted its
participants in an attempt to achieve an institution sized to match the scale of
the problem. Thus the Program, not the participants, “operates at multiple
scales,” but only in the sense that the Program itself has become a myriad of
nested committees and subcommittees.240 Although all of its structure and
focus is built around adaptive management of the many problems facing the
Chesapeake Bay—a massive problem with aspects of both sprawl and hypoxia
—as with CalFed, the participant agencies have coordinated through a separate
institutionalized structure that has absorbed the accountability and obscured the
autonomy of the separate, participating state and federal agencies.241 Like
CalFed, people speak of whether the Program is a success or failure. Recent
assessments point more towards the latter.242
3. Designing Multiagency Coordination Success
So, under what whittling-away strategy is regulatory brilliance most likely
to emerge? The solo strategy keeps each agency locked in its own myopic

236. See Harry R. Hughes & Thomas W. Burke, Jr., The Cleanup of the Chesapeake Bay:
A Test of Political Will, 11 Nat. Resources & Env’t 30, 31 (Fall 1996).
237. See Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 Wm. &
Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 379, 380 (2000).
238. Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals
in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 Envtl. L. 1239, 1272 (2008).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1274.
241. In their recent study of the Chesapeake Bay Program, which involved numerous
interviews with staff, Rena Steinzor and Shana Jones found the lack of clear accountability
mechanisms as a primary obstacle, along with a slow-moving collaborative structure. See Rena
Steinzor & Shana Jones, Center for Progressive Reform, An Accountability
Mechanism for the Chesapeake Bay 2–3 (2008).
242. See generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Chesapeake Bay Program:
Improved Strategies Are Needed to Better Assess, Report, and Manage Restoration
Progress, GAO-06-96 (2005) (reviewing program management difficulties and performance
shortfalls).
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world, blind to the full scope of the problem and to the interaction of its policy
measures with those of other agencies. At the other extreme, strong
institutionalized multiagency coordination strategies like CalFed and the
Chesapeake Bay Program can lead to a tail wagging many dogs.
By contrast, the Gulf Hypoxia Task Force represents a promising middle
ground, but one in need of more aggressive endorsement and direction by
legislatures and courts. Through self-organization at the prodding of Congress,
the Task Force agencies have achieved far more coordination than could
reasonably be expected under the solo strategy. The agencies not only
exchanged information but also agreed on the nature of the problem, identified
promising policy responses, and allocated policy tasks among multiagency
clusters. Yet this was achieved without the transfer of autonomy or the shifting
of accountability inherent in the strong coordination strategy taken by CalFed
and the Chesapeake Bay Program. No agency has yielded to group decisionmaking authority, and each has remained responsible in a very real sense to its
legislative, public, and executive constituencies. Unlike CalFed and the
Chesapeake Bay Program, the Task Force is avoiding the temptation to devise a
master plan for coordination of the agency network. In short, the Task Force
has resisted the impulse to “match” its way toward a “one-fell-swoop” solution.
While it was wise of the Task Force to take this approach, the weak-ties
approach is not without its own risks. There may be additional bureaucratic
transaction costs, lack of authority to implement actions decided by the
network, and conflicting agency mandates that frustrate attempts at collective
action. Agencies can play politics as well as any legislature, and could simply
use a task force as a cover for inaction.243
Thus, as with any institutional arrangement, the Task Force’s success
depends on political will, adequate funding, and long-term commitment. These
will not simply flow from good intentions and adoption of the Task Force’s
network model. Indeed, the Task Force’s unusual composition exposes it to a
unique set of challenges in administrative law. To succeed, multiagency
network projects such as the Gulf Hypoxia Task Force need help from
administrative law to move their coordination schemes past the “we shall
coordinate” mantra while avoiding the master planning trap. We believe four
measures will be critical in providing this support.
First, legislatures must endorse and encourage participation in multiagency network projects or task forces. They must clearly express that agency
participation, while expected, poses no risk of loss of autonomy. The task force
must exist solely to coordinate agency responses, not to control them.
Second, each legislature must provide to its respective agency participant
a clear statement of authority, overarching goals, and benchmark performance

243. Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in John E. Chubb and Paul
E. Peterson, Can the Government Govern? 285 (1989).

Ruhl.FINAL.doc (Do Not Delete)

118

3/19/2010 3:19 PM

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:59

standards. These parameters will serve as accountability mechanisms constraining an agency’s exercise of discretion. As a result, each agency must enter the
network with a clear understanding of its range of discretion and expected
performance benchmarks, even if generally stated and even if, as is likely, they
touch on only part of the overall problem being addressed through the network.
Third, the task force or other collective entity should be designed to signal
that no accountability rests with the collective entity. This means that direct
public participation in task force process should be limited and direct judicial
review of task force products disallowed. This removes significant institutional
disincentives for agencies to participate in the network. Furthermore, it
facilitates the task force serving as a safe harbor for open sharing of
information, insights, and strategies among the participating agencies. By
retaining full autonomy, however, each participant agency also retains full
accountability for its decisions. Each agency will answer to public participation
and judicial review mechanisms according to its organic law, not through the
task force as proxy.
Fourth, agency participation in the network should be accorded judicial
deference. Agency decisions grounded in the findings and recommendations of
the task force should be given the same judicial deference as if the agency
made the findings itself. Both should be regarded as the product of the expert
agency’s deliberation. When an agency decides how to whittle away at a
massive problem—which knife to use and where and how to cut—basing its
decisions on what it has learned from the task force should be just as acceptable
as relying completely on its own assessment of the problem.
The objective of these proposals is to make agency participation in the
multiagency network an attractive proposition and to avoid having the task
force become the tail wagging many dogs. As the task force does not exist in
any formal accountability sense, agencies participating in the network are held
accountable through the ties people forge, not solely through formal
institutional relationships. Each agency retains full institutional autonomy and
accountability and thus is insulated from the derivative risk that challenges to
or failure of a more formal institutional arrangement could present.
Participation in this form of networked task force structure therefore costs each
participant agency little more than the commitment of personnel time, but
potentially reaps significant policy benefits at both the single agency and
multiagency scales.
Our institutional model has yet to be tested against a massive problem in
practical application. The Gulf Hypoxia Task Force, as much as it seems to
embrace the theoretical underpinnings of the model, has itself predicted that
addressing Gulf hypoxia meaningfully will not come quickly. Massive
problems plagued by deeply embedded feedback loops, discontinuities, and
system complexities are unlikely to be easily uprooted even by the most
thoughtful combinations of Dynamic Federalism, New Governance, and
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Transgovernmental Networks theories. That said, the experiences of CalFed
and the Chesapeake Bay Program make clear that what is needed is not more
agencies working solo, or more “strong ties” efforts to coordinate multiple
agencies into one collective superentity, but rather an environment facilitating
more “weak ties” networks among the people within the agencies working on
massive problems. While this approach may not produce regulatory brilliance
every time, it seems to us far more likely to meaningfully address massive
problems than will the solo or strong coordination approaches.
CONCLUSION
Regulation in the modern administrative state touches almost all facets of
our daily lives and has done a remarkably good job of improving our safety,
our productivity, and our quality of life. Yet the general success that regulation
has enjoyed over time has relied largely on its ability to identify and attack
social and economic problems with relatively discrete sources and apparent
cause-and-effect mechanisms. In retrospect, these have been, as Nobel Laureate
Thomas Schelling described, the “easy cases . . . in which the aggregate is
merely an extrapolation from the individual.”244 The significant problems that
remain on the horizon for regulatory law, and which thus far have proven
intractable, involve the “hard cases” in which the cumulative effects of
decisions and actions taken by multitudes of persons, businesses, governments,
and other entities acting with no deliberate coordination, or even a common
purpose, lead to aggregate consequences of huge dimension. It is the
combination of a large, loose network of diverse actors, a complex causal
chain, and spatial and temporal discontinuities that make these cumulative
effects problems such a snarl for the administrative state.
In this Article, we have developed a model to help agencies that are tasked
with whittling away at such problems but given no guidance on how to do so.
By defining policy problems more carefully than simply saying they are
“complex,” “massive,” or “wicked,” our analysis has matched promising
regulatory strategies with specific types of massive problems.
For the most difficult problems, “policy jungles” with cumulative effects
confounded by feedback loops and discontinuities, our analysis has pointed
toward greater reliance on multiagency, multi-instrument policy responses.
This recommendation comes with a caution, however.245 The quest for a
comprehensive solution is tempting in the face of a cumulative effects
problem—whatever the problem is called, create an agency, name it after the
problem, and set it loose to regulate. After more than thirty-five years of that
approach in environmental law, and even longer in other fields, none of the big
244. Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior 13 (1978).
245. In complex social systems, “[s]tability, security, and equilibrium . . . can be deceptive,
for they are but momentary eddies in an endlessly complex and turbulent flux.” Mark C. Taylor,
The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network Culture 3 (2001).
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problems have gone away and some have grown worse. It is no accident that
the Gulf Hypoxia Task Force, comprised of people who have long wrestled
with the problem under the conventional model, eventually emerged as a
loosely-bound, multiagency, multi-instrument approach.
Ultimately, however, our central message is that whittling away at
massive problems is as much about the individual agency as it is the networked
multiagency task force. On one hand, the solo agency strategy is a futile
undertaking, leaving all agencies with jurisdiction over a piece of the massive
problem yet blinded to its full scope. On the other hand, the strong coordination
strategy pits agencies against each other and the coordinated entity as they fight
to retain autonomy and shift accountability. Regulatory brilliance is unlikely to
emerge from either strategy. By contrast, the “weak ties” task force approach
presents a powerful balance. It helps to align many agencies addressing a
cumulative effects problem and to facilitate interagency cooperation by
supporting rather than supplanting each agency’s authority and responsibility to
act. Even the “weak ties” approach, though, is no panacea, for it offers no
guarantee that effective actions will follow.
To the head of an agency dealing with a massive problem, the Supreme
Court’s pithy advice in Massachusetts v. EPA thus is insightful on one point
and unhelpful on another. The Court is dead right that agencies must whittle
away, however daunting the task. What is unhelpful, however, is the Court’s
implication that “massive problems” come in only one variety and present no
special problems for administrative law. As we have shown, massive problems
come in many forms, some amenable to casual whittling and others resistant to
the sharpest blade. It is these hard problems, made difficult because of
cumulative effects, where innovations in agency coordination are most needed
and will prove most effective.

